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EXCLUSION AND MODIFICATION OF
WARRANTY UNDER THE U.C.C.-How TO
SUCCEED IN BUSINESS WITHOUT BEING
LIABLE FOR NOT REALLY TRYING
By JOHN'E.

MOYE*

Recent decisions involving disclaimer of warranty have generated considerable confusion. These decisions are often irreconcilable or are based on nebulous notions of public policy. In this
timely and well documented article, Mr. Moye examines the pertinent Code provisions in light of their applications, and discusses
some of the policy considerationsinherent in these decisions. Moreover, he distills the rules for an effective disclaimer as the, have
been developed and modified by judicial interpretation. Finally,
he derives four principles which should guide the drafting of an
effective disclaimer:(1) define the risk, (2) negotiate the disclaimer; (3) clarify the agreement; and (4) prepare the evidence.
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INTRODUCTION

A sironic
as it may seem, the Uniform Commercial Code, promulgated specifically "to simplify, clarify and modernize

the law

governing commercial transactions;"'

has prompted a profusion

of conflicting and often irreconcilable opinions regarding the
'UNIFORM

U.C.C.1

COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(2) (a)

(1962 version)

[hereinafter cited as
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use of its warranty exclusion provisions.2 The reason behind such
diverse interpretations of a uniform code provision may be that
warranty cases must be decided on their facts, and the facts are
nearly always distinguishable. Each case then must balance the
interests served by the disclaimer against the interests giving rise
to the warranty being disclaimed, 3 and since those interests are
as varied as the persons whom they affect, it is not difficult to
understand why the cases are less than consistent. One student of
the disclaimer, after studying its evolution over a period of thirty
years, concluded that the underlying thesis behind the cases was
a determination to preserve a fair remedy in contract. 4 This diagnosis, typical of the generality required in this area of law, is
probably accurate but does little to define a method by which a
seller may prevent warranty liability. Moreover, the modern vendor
is subject to innumerable consumer pressures, not the least of
which is strict tort liability--a legal hazard that is apparently
immune to disclaimer of any kind.' Consequently, the ability to
limit warranty liability may indeed be "The manufacturer's last
stand ..

6

The classic case in the law of disclaimers is a good starting
point because it involved a disclaimer that "had everything wrong
with it." 7 In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,' the clause
referring to the disclaimer was printed in type which was described by the court as "the least legible and most difficult to read
in the instrument .... .. The disclaimer was printed in small
type, on the back of the contract, among a series of clauses that
covered 81/ inches of fine print. Moreover, this was a standard
contract used by all automobile manufacturers and the buyer had
no freedom of choice whatever. Futhermore, the manufacturer
had provided Mr. and Mrs. Henningsen with an illusory, and
2The greatest confusion results from section 2-316, the major disclaimer provision.

Warranty of title has its own disclaimer provisions in section 2-312(2), and some
warranties may be disclaimed because they are cumulative and conflicting under
section 2-317. See text, § 111(A) (2) infra.
3See Note, Disclaimers of Warrant),in Consumer Sales, 77 HARV. L. REV. 318, 325
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Note, Disclaimers).
4See Note, Limitations on Freedom to Modify Contract Remedies, 72 YALE L.J. 723,
729 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Note, Limitations].
5 See Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipse, Pigeonholes and Communication
Barriers, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 5, 40, 43 (1965). See also, Noel, Products
Liability of Retailers and Manufacturers in Tennessee, 32 TENN. L. REV. 207,
251-52 (1965). Disclaimer is a contractual concept, and thus not really applicable
in an action based on tort theory.
6 See Duesenberg, The Manufacturer's Last Stand: The Disclaimer, 20 Bus. LAW.
159 (1964).
7
1d. at 165.
832 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
9Id.at 365, 161 A.2d at 73.
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thereby worthless, expressed warranty which was to the exclusion
of all warranties.' ° Understandably, the court reacted strongly to
the disclaimer, finally declaring it to be invalid, probably because
it violated public policy." In doing so, the court established a
poorly defined standard which has encouraged courts to invalidate
disclaimers on the basis of vague notions of public policy. 2 While
the facts of the Henningsen case were highly unusual and hard
cases can make bad law, the decision certainly indicates that each
disclaimer must be evaluated within its individual context.
Warranty protection is a very important part of the consumer's legal arsenal. 1 The vendor generally occupies a far superior bargaining position, especially so in light of the fact that
the seller usually prepares the contract. Warranties were developed
to help correct this imbalance.' 4 On the other hand, there are a
number of unimpeachable reasons for a seller's attempting to
either limit or exclude his warranty liability. The use of a disclaimer can aid in the accurate determination of the seller's costs
by controlling the risk which he assumes. 5 Certainly the price of
a product is dependent up on the potential liability involved in
its sale. Where such liability is particularly difficult to estimate,
it may be impractical for the seller to market the product without
employing a disclaimer. I" This is especially true where he is a
'0 See Note, Limitations, supra note 4, at 736. See also the discussion in 36

NOTRE

DAME LAW. 233 '(1961).

It is significant to note that shortly after the Henningsen opinion was
published, all of the major automobile manufacturers increased the warranty
period on their products. Beginning with the 1961 model year, the standard
warranty will have a one year or 12,000 mile duration, instead of 90 days
or 4,000 miles .... Under the old warranty the buyer received nothing.
Under the new he receives three times nothing.
Id. at 236-37.
11 See Note, Limitations, supra note 4, at 736. See also Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About
Physical Harm, Disclaimers and Warranties, 4 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 285, 303-07
(1963) ; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9,
47-48 (1966).
12 See Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966).
But see Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Vr. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140, 144-45
(1967).
1aSee the policy arguments set forth in Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability
Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 1008-12
(1966).
14 Compare U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1 with U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
15 See Duesenberg, supra note 6, at 162, where the author laments that disclaimers are
occasionally used deceptively for risk elimination rather than forthrightly for risk
control. See also Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 326-27.
16 See Blackburn, Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 ARB. J. (n.s.)
173 '(1967). The author notes that implied warranties, and what is required under
them, is not known, and therefore, the seller's potential liability is uncertain. Further,
in the case of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the seller
cannot be sure, unless he has disclaimed the warranty altogether, just what warranties
one of his salesmen might be held to have made. Id. at 180.

1969

EXCLUSION OF WARRANTY

marginal entrepreneur who is unable to shoulder the expenses occasioned by strict liability.' 7 Similarly, the price of a product reflects
the cost of repair or replacement and if the seller is unable to
rely on a disclaimer of this responsibility, he must necessarily raise
his price. To do this may impair his ability to compete effectively
and he could be forced out of business for lack of a reliable disclaimer.'" A related reason for a seller's disclaiming responsibility
is that he simply cannot estimate the quality of the product he is
selling or the amount of risk involved.' 9 Finally, the seller may
be concerned by the expensive litigation costs involved in a products liability or warranty action and thus desires to escape responsibility for the product as easily as possible. Certainly, if a buyer
is willing to accept the risks, what reason could exist for not
allowing him to enter into an agreement of his choosing? However,
for the buyer to enter into a contract he must be fairly appraised
of his rights and responsibilities under that contract. Herein lies
one of the elements of an effective disclaimer -impress upon the
buyer that the risk is his.2" Of course, the seller cannot afford to
create anxieties in his buyers to a point where the product becomes unmarketable. 21 Accordingly, the object in the disclaimer
game is to exclude warranty responsibility as softly, and as legally,
as possible.
Unquestionably, sellers possess the capacity to limit warranty
liability as to expressed and implied warranties, by sufficiently
specific and clear language. 2 Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
17 See Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 327-28.
18 This consideration does not apply solely to the seller who is marketing an inferior

product. Any seller will admit that no matter how reliable his inspection system is,
mistakes are made.
19 See Prosser, supra note 11, at 46.
20 Dean William D. Hawkland (of Buffalo School of Law) has developed the proposi-

21

22

tion by using the celebrated case of Gardner v. Gray, 171 Eng. Rep. 46, 47 (N.P.
1815). "The purchaser," thundered Lord Ellenborough, "cannot be supposed to buy
goods to lay them on a dunghill." Dean Hawkland commented: "He might have
added that the buyer has no cause to complain that the goods ultimately end up on
the dunghill if the situation makes clear to him that the risk is his." Hawkland,
Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 How. L.J. 28,
30-31 (1965).
See Boshkoff, supra note 11, at 307. In fact, it would be unreasonable to expect a
seller to impress upon a buyer that a possibility existed that one of every thousand
items sold would be harmful, and this particular one could be it. Id. The buyer need
only know that the quality of the item is his risk, and that he should conduct himself
accordingly.
See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Flexible Tubing Corp., 270 F. Supp. 548, 561 (D. Conn.
1967). This pre-code law still applies to the sections of the U.C.C. dealing with
disclaimer. Freedom of the parties to make their own agreement is inherent in the
Code, and is upheld by the courts. See, e.g., Construction Aggregates Corp. v. HewittRobins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969).
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if the rules are followed all warranty liability may be excluded.2
Similarly, the courts appear willing to uphold these disclaimers
where it appears that the disclaimer was a product of mutual agreement and made in the absence of fraud.24 However, as is indicated
by the Henningsen decision, a successful disclaimer must be both
bargained for and equitable. Moreover, the length of that opinion
and the volume of litigation regarding disclaimers is indicative
of the close judicial scrutiny such provisions must be able to withstand. Although, the Uniform Commercial Code provisions assist
the draftsman in preparing an ostensibly bargained for and equitable disclaimer, judicial scrutiny remains as yet the most difficult
hurdle. In order to successfully draft such a provision, one must
understand not only the nature and purpose of its use, but also
the technical requirements and contexts in which they may be used.
These aspects will be examined in light of the applicable Code
provisions and their treatment by the courts in order to gain
insights into the drafting of such a disclaimer provision.
I.

EXCLUSION OR MODIFICATION OF THE EXPRESS WARRANTY

The best way to avoid the liability imposed by an express
warranty is not to create the warranty in the first place. It is a
contradiction of the highest order for the seller to expressly assure
the buyer that the product will perform while at the same time
assure him that it may not. Certainly it would be a perversion of
the law to let the seller get away with it. It is to this situation,
where the seller gives an express warranty in one breath and takes
it back in the next, that section 2-316(1) is directed.
The 1952 version of the Uniform Commercial Code adopted a
strong position on disclaimer of express warranties, declaring:
"Ifthe agreement creates an express warranty, words disclaiming it
are inoperative."2 5 Commentators concluded from this provision
that no matter how carefully the sales contract was drawn, express
warranties could not be excluded.2" In the current edition this
section has for some reason emerged with what appears to be
23 U.C.C. § 2-316.
24 See, e.g., Sarwark Motor Sales, Inc. v. Husband, 5 Ariz. App. 304, 426 P.2d 404
(1967) ; Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140 (1967);
25

Northwest Collectors, Inc. v. Gerritsen, 446 P.2d 197 (Wash. 1968).
U.C.C. § 2-316 (1952 version).

26 See Note, The Uniform Commercial Code and Greater Consumer Protection Under

Warranty Law, 49 KY. L.J. 240, 253 (1961). This article, referring to the early
Code provision as the "old orthodox view," comments that such a strenuous position
is contrary to "general contract principles." Id.
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a considerably different rule. 7 Section 2-316(1) now provides:
Words or conduct relevent to the creation of an express warranty
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
subject to the provisions of this article on parol or extrinsic evidence (section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the
extent that such construction is unreasonable.
Whereas the original rule provided some guidance in this
subject, no matter how distastful it may have been to the merchant, the present position remands the issue to the courts, who
are hard pressed to interpret the new language differently from
the old.2

A. Exclusion or Modification Through Language Related to
Express Warranty
The Code permits the creation of an express warranty in three
ways: (1) any affirmation of fact or promise which relates to the
goods; (2) any description of the goods; or (3) any sample or
model.29 When any of these situations occur and the representations
become part of the "basis of the bargain" an express warranty is
created.3° Where this warranty is inconsistent with other language
within the contract (i.e., the disclaimer) it will be construed as an
ambiguity of terms which is resolved by making one term yield
to the other."1 The purpose of the disclaimer provision relating
to these express warranties is to "protect a buyer from unexpected
and unbargained for language of disclaimer. ' 3' Therefore, language
Some of the legislative history of section 2-316 is contained in Hogan, The Highways
and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk Sales Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 7 n.25 (1962). There is evidence, however, that
some pressure was brought to bear on the draftsmen of the Code by persons who
were interested in effectively disclaiming their warranties. See Ezer, The Impact of
the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties, 8
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 281, 310 (1961), where the author quotes Professor Grant Gilmore
who stated that he was: "[inclined to cite the drafting history of 2-316 ... as an
illustration of the useful truth that when a law professor ventures out into the real
world, as a draftsman of statutes . . . he will be well advised to take his brass
knuckles along; he will need them before he gets through." Id. at 310, quoting from,
Lectures by Professor G. Gilmore, No. 4, at 13 (unpublished lectures at Yale Law
School, 1958).
28See Berk v. Gordon Johnson Co., 232 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1964). "Section
2-316 of the 1952 version of the Code stated simply, in subsection (1), 'If the agreement creates an express waranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative.' The Michigan
version of this provision modifies the 1952 language, but the spirit of the provision
remains the same." Id. at 688 (emphasis added). See generally Note, The Uniform
Commercial Code and Greater Consumer Protection Under Warranty Law, 49 KY.
L.J. 240, 253 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Note, Consumer Protection].
SU.C.C. § 2-313(1).
30 "The basis of the bargain" test is a reliance factor used to weave the warranty "into
the fabric of the agreement." U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3. It is easy to extend the
'express" warranty concept beyond the specific rules outlined in section 2-313(1).
See Shanker, supra note 5, at 40-41 n.124, and text accompanying notes 54-57, infra.
31 See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 28-29.
2
U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1. See First National Bank v. Husted, 57 Ill.
App. 2d 227,
205 N.E.2d 780, 784 (1965).
2
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which creates an inconsistency, leaving both the buyer and seller
unable to appraise their respective risks, or language which is
unclear and gives rise to an ambiguity, is ineffectual in disclaiming
an express warranty. It is easy to deduce that since the warranty
is both expressed and disclaimed by certain language, in most
33
cases that language will be inconsistent.
In such cases, a reconciliation process is employed, or, if
reconciliation is impossible, some theory is adopted which declares
a consistent construction of the terms to be "unreasonable," thereby
allowing section 2-316(1) to sever the disclaimer from the contract
as "inoperative."3 4 Several theories have been proposed for justifying this result when it appears that reconciliation of the terms
is impossible. Suppose that a buyer and a seller agree on a contract which states that the product being sold is guaranteed to
perform trouble-free for two years. The contract also provides
that "there are no warranties, express or implied." First, it may
be said that the express warranty is created by specific terms,
whereas the disclaimer is couched in general terms. Since, by a
familiar rule of construction, specific terms prevail over the general,
the express warranty will prevail. 35 Secondly, the law is settled
that ambiguities in a contract of sale will be construed against the
party who created them" and, since the seller provided these conflicting contract terms, he should be held to his warranty.3 7 Thirdly,
the contract should be examined to determine if its language, read
as a whole, fairly apprises the parties of their respective risks. If
it does not, the matter must be resolved arbitrarily.38 Finally, since
an express warranty is created only when the enumerated factors
become "part of the basis of the bargain,"3 " a disclaimer of one
of those factors is a disclaimer of part of the bargain itself. The
disclaimer is ignored, then, because it reaches to the "essence" of
0
the contract and to uphold it would be to destroy the bargain. 4
The numerous theories for defeating a disclaimer leads one to
33 See generally Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
916, 919-20 (1964).

34 "[T]he critical determination turns on whether the apparently conflicting language
of the warranty and disclaimer clauses can be reconciled. If it can, the disclaimer will
be given at least the limited effect of illuminating the whole contract and thereby
modifying the protective thrust of the warranty. If it cannot, the disclaimer will be
completely rejected."
Hawkland, supra note 20, at 28-29.
35See Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28, at 253.
36

See 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 559, at 262 (1960).
37 See Note, Strict Products Liability, supra note 33, at 919.
38
39

See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 29.
U.C.C. § 2-313(1).

40 See Note, Limitations, supra note 4, at 738-39.
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wonder whether a disclaimer can ever be reasonably construed to
be consistent with the express warranty.
1. Warranty by Affirmation of Fact or Promise.
The type of express warranty which a seller would most like
to disclaim with impunity is the warranty by affirmation of fact.
This legal millstone has long plagued the art of salesmanship, 4'
and the drafters of the Code recognized that some statements made
by sellers just can not, in common experience, be considered to be
part of the bargain.4 2 While the seller cannot consistently affirm
a fact about a product and then subsequently disaffirm it, he may
make his pitch and then retreat a bit. For example, suppose the
contract is for the sale of "one copper brewing vat with a two-ton
capacity." The seller may disclose to the buyer that this item will
not corrode or decay for a period of years, and a warranty to that
effect has been made. However, the seller could add that in order
to prevent corrosion and decay, the purchaser must undertake a
regular maintenance program, and if such a program is not successfully performed, the guarantee will not apply. Dean Hawkland
points out that often the parties do not intend the warranty clause
to be given its plain meaning. In such a case, a disclaimer may
be employed to modify, but not to negate, the warranty.4 3 There
are two key issues in his analysis (1) the modification (not
negation) of the warranty, and (2) the intention of the parties.44
The negation of the warranty is flatly prohibited by section
2-316(1). If the warranty is stated, and then negated, no reasonable construction of such terms as consistent with each other is
possible. On the other hand, when the warranty is modified, the
words of disclaimer tend to explain the words of warranty, rather
than contradict them.
The intent of the parties is important because section 2-316
was drafted in order to protect the buyer from unbargained language
of disclaimer. 45 How could a buyer really intend to enter into an
agreement if he wasn't aware of significant terms of the contract?
The intention of the seller at the time the statements are made is irrelevant to the
determination of a warranty. See U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3. See also Charles F.
Curry & Co. v. Hedrick, 378 S.W.2d 522, 536 (Mo. 1964); Turner v. Central
Hardware Co., 353 Mo. 1182, 186 S.W.2d 603, 608 (1945); Compton v. M. O'Neil
Co., 101 Ohio App. 378, 381, 139 N.E.2d 635, 638 (1955).
42U.C.C. § 2-313(2) states that "an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or
a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the
goods does not create a warranty." But whether or not the statements made constituted warranty still remains for the court to determine. See Dailey v. Holiday
41

Distrib. Corp., 260 Iowa 859, 151 N.W.2d 477 (1967).

43 Hawkland, supra note 20, at 29.
44 The seller's intention in creating the express warranty is, of course, irrelevant. It is
the intention of both parties that it be modified that is important here.
45 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
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Consequently, if the seller impresses upon the buyer that the risk
is his, and the buyer persists in his purchase after being so appraised,
then the seller should be relieved from responsibility for that risk."
Whether or not the buyer has been adequately apprised of his responsibilities is a question of fact, and the effectiveness of the
disclaimer is dependent on that determination.17 The problem is
clearly one of draftmanship, since the written contract may be
drafted in such a way as to completely determine all liability
resulting from the express warranty.48 One authority has recommended that the language of disclaimer should immediately follow
the language of warranty. 49 Another has concluded that the disclaimer and warranty language must at least be on the same page
of the contract. 50 In short, it must be apparent that the buyer clearly
understood which risks are his and which risks remain the seller's
responsibility. Where it appears from the entire agreement that
a reasonable buyer would expect the seller to assume certain risks
even though the seller had no intention of doing so, a court will
overlook any language of disclaimer and will require the seller
to perform. 5
It should be apparent that affirmations of fact should be made
sparingly, and only when the seller is willing and able to keep
them. If any affirmation of fact is not absolutely true, or if a
promise will be honored only in selective situations, the seller must
say so immediately. For example, the seller cannot claim the product
is "rustproof" and later say that this is applicable only where the
product is used indoors. Neither can he promise to replace parts
for two years, and afterwards interpose that the guarantee is conditional on the seller's approval of the buyer's maintenance program.
Words which disclaim part of the effect of a warranty, and follow
immediately thereafter may be construed as modifying the warranty,
rather than negating it. Moreover, since value judgments are allowed by the Code, the seller should coach his salesmen to preface
A court has recognized that the parties have the right to fix warranties by mutual
agreement. See Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140,
144 (1967) (and case cited therein).
47The court may make several different determinations if it finds that the buyer has
not been made aware of his risks. See text, § V, infra.
48 See text, § I (c) infra.
49 Hogan, supra note 27, at 7.
50 Blackburn, supra note 16, at 178.
51Once an affirmation of fact is made, a warranty is created, whether or not the seller
ever intended such an effect. "[Any fact which is to take such affirmations, once
made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof." U.C.C. § 2-313,
Comment 3. Thus, the seller would have to affirmatively show that no reasonable
buyer could have relied on the affirmation of fact before the disclaimer could be
effective.
46

1969

EXCLUSION OF WARRANTY

their comments with the words "in my opinion," in order to ensure
that they are taken as such and not as affirmations of fact.
2. Warranty by Description

Where the express warranty has been created by a description
of the goods, that description must be complied with, and cannot be
disclaimed by any language. This conclusion is based on the fundamental contract principle that a vendor cannot sell apples and send
oranges. In the example where "one copper brewing vat with twoton capacity" is the subject matter of a contract which also contains
a clause disclaiming all warranties, it cannot be concluded by any
reasonable construction that the seller could deliver a tin brewing
vat, or a copper vat with one-ton capacity, or a copper mixing vat,
without suffering warranty liability.5 2 If the seller has stated a
53
description, he must conform to it.
Because the description warranty is immune to disclaimer, courts
and commentators are anxious to fit as many transactions as possible
into this category. One author contends that a contract to deliver a
"truck" may be construed as describing a "workable truck," and an
express warranty to that effect is thereby created. 4 A recent case
considered a contract for cotton seed which described the product
as follows: "60, 50# bags Hi-Vigor Stoneville 213 Demonsan treatment." At the same time the contract contained a disclaimer of all
warranty "as to description, productiveness, or any other matter
of any seed that we sell...
,5
and it further disclaimed responsibility for the crop. The state regulations required that the
percentage of germination of the seeds be stated on a tag and
attached to each bag.56 In this case, each tag showed the germination to be 80 percent but a test of some of the seed, after unsuccessful attempts at production showed a germination of only 27.75
percent. The plaintiff sued for breach of warranty and the defendant
interposed the disclaimer. The court refused to uphold the disclaimer, claiming that the germination guarantee was part of the
description of the product. However, was this really any more
than an affirmation of fact? The official comments to section 2-313
52 Of course, the seller probably could describe the product, and then immediately

modify it. For example, "one copper brewing vat with two-ton capacity, but without
normal valve fittings which are needed to operate a brewing vat." But these modifications are part of a new description, and do not constitute a disclaimer.
52 See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 28-30; Weeks, The Illinois Uniform Commercial
Code: Article 2- Sales, 50 ILL. B.J. 494, 515 (1962).
54 Shanker, supra note 5, at 40-41 n.124.
55 Walcott & Steele, Inc. v. Carpenter, 246 Ark. 93, 436 S.W.2d 820, 822, 6 U.C.C.
Rep. 89, 91 (1969).
56 Id. An interesting point to note here is that a governmental regulation, by requiring
a description, creates a warranty which is immune to disclaimer.
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recognize that a "description" may include technical specifications,
blueprints, and possibly even the quality of the goods previously
delivered by the seller."7 Therefore, the types of statements which
may be treated as a description and which as such are immune to a
disclaimer, are quite numerous.
To the extent that a warranty of description arises from the
course of dealings, a seller may find himself in a precarious position.
For example, if the seller had contracted to deliver onion seed to
the buyer, and he delivered "Grade A onion seed" he has created a
warranty of description and the buyer can expect the next delivery
to conform therewith. Because warranties of description cannot be
disclaimed or totally avoided in a continuous performance contract,
a seller would be well advised to periodically re-evaluate his conduct
to insure that he is able to perform to the expectations that the buyer
has assumed.
Since parties to a contract always describe the subject matter
of the contract, a description warranty is made in every case. As a
practical matter, the seller should couch the description in general
terms and should be certain that the product described can be delivered. If he is not certain whether he can deliver "one copper
brewing vat with two-ton capacity" he should delete that part of
the description about which he is uncertain. If the buyer insists on
each element of the description the seller might consider foregoing
the transaction. At least he should be aware of the fact that he
cannot rely on disclaiming language in the contract to save him
from the struggle with a description once it has been made.
3. Warranty by Sample or Model
The circumstances and statements of the seller surrounding the

displaying of a sample or model play an important part in deciding
whether or not a disclaimer is effective. The official comments
describe certain presumptions with which the seller must contend.
A presumption exists that any sample or model is intended to become part of the basis of the bargain, but the presumption is not
as strong when the model represents merchandise not on hand.5 8
Thus, when showing a product, the seller has an opportunity to
impress upon the buyer that the sample or model is intended only
to "suggest," rather than to "be," the character of the subject matter
of the contract.5 9 However, the seller must do so in a clear and
57U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 5.
58 U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 6.
59
d. See Baltimore Machine & Equip., Inc. v. Holtite Mfg. Co., 241 Md. 36, 215
A.2d 458 (1965).
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convincing manner because he must overcome the presumption that
the displayed item is part of the basis of the bargain," ° and he will
have to convince a jury that the buyer understood the reason for
displaying the item."' The exclusion of the warranty created by the
displaying of a sample or model must be contemporaneous with the
display, since the facts and circumstances surrounding that incident
are determinative of the effect of that warranty.6 2 The contract, which
would ordinarily contain the written disclaimer where one is to be
used, is usually executed after the sample or model has been shown.
Thus, it seems that written disclaimers which are not contemporaneous with the displaying of a sample would be as ineffective
against the sample as they are against an express warranty of description. This is so because, once the sample has been deemed to
be representative of the product, the sample really becomes the
description,63 and the policy surrounding disclaimer of a warranty
by description would be equally applicable here.6 4 Therefore, when
showing a sample or model, the seller should impress upon the
buyer that the item displayed is only intended to "suggest" the
character of the finished product. The seller can do so by having
words printed on the item or on a conspicuous tag attached thereto
stating: "This samplet is intended to suggest the characted of our
product. Manufacturing processes may produce variations in the
finished product which are not evident from this sample." The
seller could even request that the buyer sign a statement of understanding to that effect when the sample is displayed. If the buyer
insists on the exact specifications of the sample, the seller may
safely assure him that every effort will be made to duplicate it, but
can not specifically promise duplication without incurring liability
were he later to be unable to comply.
60 The distinction between "suggesting" and "being" is drawn in the official comment.
U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 6. It would seem that the seller, by pointing out that the
displayed item is intended only to "suggest" the product, is really never creating
any warranty, rather than disclaiming one. In fact, a district court in Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. Flexible Tubing Corp., 270 F. Supp. 548, 562 (D. Conn. 1967), held that
the mere exhibition of a sample does not mean that the sale is by sample. Id. at 562.
There is no indication that this pre-Code law is not equally applicable to section
2-313. See also American Canning Co. v. Flat Top Grocery Co., 68 W. Va. 698,
703-04, 70 S.E. 756, 759 (1911). However, in view of the fact that the Code speaks
of a presumption that a warranty arises when a sample or model is displayed, it is
better to assume that what is being done is disclaiming a warranty that has been
created. See U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 6.
61 See Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1
(1967).
62
See U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 6.
63 See, e.g.. Baltimore Machine & Equip., Inc. v. Holtite Mfg. Co., 241 Md. 36, 41,
215 A.2d 458, 460-61 (1965).
64See text, § I(A) (2) supra, and Note, Limitations, supra note 4 at 738-39. See also,
Weeks, supra note 53, at 515.
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To rely only on language of disclaimer in order to avoid the
effect of an express warranty is a hazardous endeavor. As was stated,
the best way to avoid express warranty liability is to avoid creating
the warranty in the first place. Language of disclaimer alone will
have no effect on a warranty of description. On the other hand, such
language can be effective to disclaim a warranty by sample or model,
but only if it is contemporaneous with the display, in such a way
as to overcome the presumption that such sample or model was a
part of the basis of the bargain, and in a manner sufficiently clear
to convince a jury that the buyer understood the limited nature of
that display. Similarily, language of disclaimer alone may be effective as to warranties arising by affirmation of fact but only where
the following criteria are met: (1) the buyer was fairly apprised
of his rights and liabilities under the contract, and (2) both parties
intended the effect of the disclaimer. Moreover, an express warranty
may never be completely negated by a disclaimer and where the
exculpatory language is to have any effect at all, it may only modify
the express warranty.
B. Exclusion or Modification of the Express Warranty Through

Recognized "Disclaimer" Language
General language of disclaimer such as "the seller makes no
warranty, express or implied," or other words and phrases of a
similar meaning, were the specific targets of section 2-316.65 Words
of art such as "with all faults" and "as is," although specifically
allowed to have a disclaiming effect under the Code, are directed
only toward exclusion of inplied warranty. "6 Of course, such language, when considered with regard to an express warranty, would
be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with the language
creating the warranty." Nonetheless it is difficult to imagine a case
where the terms "as is" or "with all faults" could be construed to
be any less than an attempt to completely negate the warranty.
Even so, the import of section 2-316 remains subject to judicial
interpretation 68 and courts have recently intimated that perhaps genComment 1.
§ 2-316(3)'(a). This section states:

65U.C.C. § 2-316,
66 U.C.C.

(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) of this section:
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults," or other language
which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion
of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty ....(emphasis added).
67

id.
This is the test prescribed by the Code. See U.C.C. § 2-316(1).

68 See Ezer, supra note 27, at 311.
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eral language may disclaim express warranties after all. 69 However,
it is significant to note that the courts which have so intimated have,
with one exception,7" not been governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code, although the decisions were handed down after the Code became effective. The confusing feature of these cases is simply that
they are included in annotations which interpret section 2-316 of
the Code,7 1 and that section intended no such interpretation. Recognized "disclaimer" language that is aimed at the exclusion of a
warranty, can be every bit as inconsistent as any other type of
language could be. In fact, to declare these clauses inoperative is
easily justified because they are directed toward the elimination of
all warranty liability. Similarily, these terms are general in nature
and as such will be ignored where inconsistent language is more
specific. 72 In conclusion, then, the courts have a number of theories
by which they could hold such disclaimers ineffective as to the express
warranty.
C. Exclusion of Express Warranties by use of the ParolEvidence Rule
Although disclaimer language directed to the express warranty
carries questionable legal weight, it is possible, through careful draftsmanship, to do indirectly that which cannot be done directly. The
parol evidence provision of the Code73 has been made applicable to
the express warranty provisions in order to protect the seller against
"false allegations of oral warranties" and "unauthorized representations."174 It does more than that. It gives the seller a second chance
if he concludes that the oral warranties or authorized representations
were improprietious. 75 According to the Code's parol evidence rule,
69

See Intrastate Credit Service, Inc. v. Pervo Paint Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 547, 552,
46 Cal. Rptr. 182, 185 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965) ("A provision that the buyer takes
the article in the condition in which it is, or 'as is,' prevents representations of the
seller, although relied upon by the buyer, from constituting express or implied
warranties." Quoting from Roberts Distributing Co. v. Kaye-Halbert Corp., 126
Cal. App. 2d 664. 669, 272 P.2d 886, 889 (1954)); Claxton v. Pullman, Inc., 116
Ga. App. 416, 418, 157 S.E.2d 642, 644 (1967) ("It is well settled that selling
'as is' and with specific disclaimer of warranty is sufficient to negate all warranties,
express or implied.") ; James Talcott, Inc. v. Finley, 389 P.2d 988, 993 (Okla.
1964) ("[L]egal corollary that such a condition ["as is"] negatives both express
and implied warranties and precludes the defense of failure of consideration.")
70A Pennsylvania lower court case, Garner v. Tomcavage, 34 Pa. Northumb. L.J. 18
(1962), said that a provision stating that the goods were sold "as is" excluded any
warranty express or implied under section 2-316. This seems to be the only case
which has implied that result under the Code, and insofar as that is what the court
intended, does not appear to be good law.

71See

I

UNIFORM

LAWS

ANNOTATED,

UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL

CODE

§

1-101

to

§ 2-725, at 242-43 (West Publishing Co. 1968).
72 See text accompanying note 35 supra, and Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28,
at 253.
73 U.C.C. § 2-202.
74U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 2.
75 See Hogan, supra note 27, at 8; Duesenberg, supra note 6, at 163; Note Consumer
Protection, supra note 28, at 252.
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terms which are set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a
final expression of their agreement, cannot be contradicted by a
prior agreement or by a contemporaneous oral agreement although,
they may be explained or supplemented. 76 Therefore the language
in the contract constitutes the complete agreement and other terms
can be included only if they do not contradict -that
is, are consistent - with the language written in the contract. Thus, if the
language in the agreement is disclaimer language, and the seller
had created an express oral warranty prior to the signing of the
contract, the warranty, to be enforced, must be consistent with the
terms of disclaimer. In such situations the buyer has the burden of
proving that the terms are consistent and an express oral warranty
is ineffective wherever inconsistent with the disclaimer.
Accordingly, if the requirements of section 2-202 are met and
the contract contains language of disclaimer, the parties have reversed the effect of section 2-316(1).
In Green Chevrolet Co. v. Kemp,77 the buyer attempted to assert
express warranty for all mechanical parts for one year. However, he
had signed a conditional sales contract which provided that all conditions and agreements were covered by that contract. The court
ruled that testimony regarding the seller's representations was improperly admitted because it was contradictory and inconsistent with
the terms of the sales contract.7" Nonetheless, consistent with the
narrow construction generally afforded rules which adversely affect
consumers, 79 courts will examine the contract carefully and apply
section 2-202 only when absolutely necessary. Of course, if the contract contains an ambiguity on its face, parol evidence may be introduced to resolve it.8 ° Such was the case in Leveridge v. Notaras,8 1
where the contract stated that the buyer accepted the automobile
"in its present condition," and that "there are no warranties or
representations, expressed or implied, not specified herein." On the
same contract the salesman had written the words, "30 day warranty"
in his handwriting in a blank portion of the form. Despite an "integration" or "merger" clause in the contract, the court allowed introduction of parol evidence to solve the ambiguity thereby created.
One difficult hurdle is proving to the court that the writing
was intended by the parties as the final expression of the agreement.
76 U.C.C. § 2-202.

143, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 805, 806 (1966).
78 Id. at 143, 3 U.C.C. Rep. at 807. See also Appeals of Reeves Soundcraft Corp.,
ASBCA Nos. 9030 and 9130, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 210, 219 (1964).
79 See text, § IV infra.
77241 Ark. 62, 406 S.W.2d 142,

80 U.C.C. § 2-202.

81 433 P.2d 935, 937, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 691, 692 (Okla. 1967).

82 Id. at 941, 4 U.C.C. Rep. at 697.
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In Hull-Dobbs, Inc. v. Mallicoat8 3 the agreement stated that it was
the entire contract between the parties, but it also stated that the
warranties were not binding on any assignee of the seller. The court
concluded that this language indicated that warranties were to be
treated separate from the agreement itself, and therefore the agree84
ment was not the final expression of the agreement of the parties.
Generally where it can be shown that the buyer agreed to the contract as the final expression of the agreement, any warranties given
prior to or contemporaneous with the signing of the contract are
inadmissable and therefore ineffective.
II.

EXCLUSION OF THE WARRANTY OF TITLE

Exclusion of the warranty of title is provided for in a separate
section of the Code. Section 2-312 provides:
(2) A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or modified
only by specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer
reason to know that the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only such right or title as he
85
or a third person may have.

The significant element in such exclusion is that the specific
language or circumstances "give the buyer reason to know" of some
unusual factor in the title.86 Some situations which indicate a disclaimer as to title are mentioned in the comments. They include sales
by "sheriffs, executors, foreclosing lienors, and persons similarly
situated ....
87 The latter group should include any seller who is
clearly selling the property on behalf of a third person as evidenced
by the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
The Code and comments do not define what is meant by
"specific language" and there is a paucity of case material on the
subject. However, the courts will likely require that the language
be conspicuous, exacting and clear in light of the pre-Code attitude
toward this warranty.8 8 In Wilson v. Manhasset Ford, Inc.,89 the
court held that to allow an automobile dealer to evade his responsibility to furnish good title by the use of a disclaimer would be
83 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1032 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).
8

4U.C.C. § 2-312(2). See also Stern & Co. v. State Loan & Finance Corp., 238 F.
Supp. 901 (D.

Del. 1965)

analogizing section 2-202 to a contract for the sale of

securities.
85 U.C.C. § 2-312(2).
6Id.
87 U.C.C. § 2-312, Comment 5.
88 See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-312, Comment 2 (McKinney 1964). Cf. Note, Contract Draftsmanship Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code. 112 U. PA. I. Rv.
564, 593 (1964).
8927 Misc. 2d 154, 156-57, 209 N.Y.S.2d 210, 212 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1960).
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subversive of public policy. At least, it has been held, reasonable
notice of the disclaimer must be given to the buyerY0
Warranty of title is not considered to be an implied warranty
and thus the general notion of disclaimer under section 2-316 is not
applicable. 1 As a result, disclaimers approved under section 2-316,
such as "as is" and "with all faults," and other disclaimers which
satisfy the requirements stated, 92 are ineffective as to the warranty
of title.9 3 While such language may well call the buyer's attention
to the risks of quality and performance, it cannot be presumed that
they would put him on notice of a defect in title. The buyer may not
be aware that he is assuming all of the risks inherent in the item
when he purchases it, but at the least he thinks he owns it. Therefore, a practical and effective disclaimer of this warranty will require
a clear statement that it is the warranty of title that is being disclaimed, and that the seller does not actually own the property being
sold. This disclaimer may be oral or written, though written notice
is preferable. For example, a sign attached to the product which
states that the seller does not claim title in himself, but is selling
for a third person, would probably be sufficient. 4
III.

EXCLUSION OR MODIFICATION OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES

OF QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE
An implied warranty is exactly what it says it is - a warranty
implied in law from the very fact that the transaction has taken
place. The obligation imposed by an implied warranty results from
implication of law, not from the conduct of the parties."' Since it
arises by operation of law, it will exist whether or not the parties
address themselves to it in the course of the transaction.9 6 One court
90

Moore v. Schlossmon's, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 693, 696, 161 N.Y.S.2d 213, 216 (City Ct.
of N.Y. 1957).
91 U.C.C. § 2-312, Comment 6. It had been considered an "implied" warranty under
the Sales Act. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 13, and for some time after the Code had been
promulgated. See Hawkland, In Re Articles 1, 2 and 6, 28 TEMPLE L.Q. 512, 515-16
(1955).
92 The language must be such as to call the buyer's attention to the exclusion of
warranty and to make it plain that there is no implied warranty. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)

(a). See text, § III(A)(1) infra.
93 See generally Note, Consumer Protection,supra note 28 at 257-58.
94 This is suggested as a method to ward off a security interest from attaching to
goods which have been consigned. U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (a).
95 See Note, Warranty Disclaimers and Limitation of Remedy for Breach of Warranty
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 43 BosToN U.L. REV.

396, 400 (1963)

[hereinafter cited as Note, Warranty Disclaimers].
9 In a sense, some of the implied warranties are very much like strict tort liability.
One court recognized that the purpose behind the implied warranty sections of the
Code is to hold the seller responsible when inferior goods are passed along to the
unsuspecting buyer. Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 377 F.2d 846, 850,
4 U.C.C. Rep. 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1967). But, unlike strict tort liability, the implied
warranties may be disclaimed. See Shanker, supra note 5, at 40.
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stated that the implied warranty is properly a matter of public
policy,9 7 and the considerations surrounding its disclaimer indicate
the implied warranty may indeed occupy that status.
Generally, the implied warranty may be excluded when there
exists words and conduct tending to show that this was the intention
of the parties. These warranties may be disclaimed by express unequivocal language where there is no problem of contradiction of
terms because some are not expressed in the contract. 8 In fact, the
language used must be "so clear, definite and specific so as to leave
no doubt as to the intent of the contracting parties.""9 Once again
it becomes a question of allocating the risk. On one hand is the
fact that the Code does not intend to burden the seller with the
same responsibility as is imposed by the law of product liability. 1°°
Freedom of contract is one of the basic propositions embodied in
the Code.'
However, section 2-316 intends to protect the buyer
from surprise,' °2 and will not permit the "expectations of the parties
to be disappointed through uncommunicative contractual provisions."103

The recommended method of disclaiming implied warranties of
quality and performance is prescribed by section 2-316 as follows:
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it, the language must
mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicious, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness
the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to
exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states,
for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond
the description on the face hereof."

In addition, certain words or conduct will automatically exclude
these implied warranties of they are present in the transaction.
Section 2-316 continues:
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) of this section:
(a) Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied
warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with
all faults" or other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of
97

Greene v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 431 (N.D. Ind. 1965). See

generally Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 901,

27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
98See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 30.

9Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585, 593 (8th Cir. 1964). This decision
was concerned with an earlier and more demanding section regarding disclaimer of
implied warranties. However, its directive is still good advice today.
100The Code allows the disclaimer of all liability for failure to manufacture or sell a
safe, workable product. See U.C.C. § 2-316. That is a far cry from strict liability
for such malfunctions. See generally Shanker, supra note 5, at 40, 43.
111See U.C.C. § 1-102(3).

10'U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
103 Hawkland, supra note 20, at 31.
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warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) When the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he
desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no
implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed
to him; and
(c) An implied warranty can also be excluded or modified
by course of dealing or course of performance or usage
of trade.
These provisions seem reasonably clear on their face, but they
are subject to interpretation and are certainly not immune from the
confusion that pervades this section of the Code. The following may
best be described as an attempt to unscramble the egg.

A. Exclusive by Language of Disclaimer
The primary consideration in evaluating the words of exclusion
for implied warranties is whether or not both parties understand the
words and their legal implication.
1. Recognized "Disclaimer" Language Which Excludes All
Implied Warranties
The Code indicates that certain words of art, and words which
import the same meaning- namely, that there is no implied warranty - will have the effect of excluding all implied warranties.
These words are "as is" and "with all faults," 1 4 and, an official
comment adds, "as they stand."' 1 It has been recognized that an
apparent inconsistency results by applying these words of art to both
implied warranties of quality and performance."0 6 Subsection (2)
to section 2-316 indicates that the implied warranty of merchantability is to be treated differently than the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose, since the former requires specific mention
of the word "merchantability." However, subsection (3) makes inapplicable the technical requirements of subsection (2)10 ' and apparently the words of art are intended to have the same effect as
stating "merchantability." In fact, to the ordinary buyer, the words
"as is" means much more than the word "merchantability." Whatever inconsistency may exist in treating the two warranties together is
10U.C.C. § 2-316.
105 Id., Comment 7. Although the comments are not part of the statute, the term "as
they stand" would, in the proper context, be properly included as "language which
in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties
and makes plain there is no implied warranty ... ." U.C.C. § 2-316(3).
100 Donovan, Recent Development in Product Liability Litigation in New England. The
Emerging Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 19 ME. L. REv. 181, 213 (1967).
10' U.C.C. § 2-316.
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probably resolved in the policy of section 2-316 which states that
the object is to "protect the buyer from surprise."'u 8 That object is
accomplished just as well by the language in subsection (3) as by
mentioning "merchantability."
Arguably, none of these words or phrases adequately apprises
the buyer of the risks he is assuming. One authority commented that
such language probably suggests only that the goods are not top
quality, but does not indicate that the goods could be useless and
might be harmful.' 0 9 But it must be assumed that the draftsmen of
the Code considered these problems and concluded that it was more
desirable to allow words of "strict disclaimer" than to attempt to
grapple with and develop a rule around each potential fact situation.
The latter job belongs to the courts, and they have refined these rules.
The bench was not shocked at the thought of a "strict disclaimer" by use of the words "as is," since pre-Code law generally
recognized this term as negating implied warranties."1 Cases which
have interpreted section 2-316 accept the effect of this language on
implied warranties. In Chamberlain v. Bob Matick Chevrolet, Inc."'
the buyer sued for breach of warranty in the sale of an automobile.
The salesman had explained to the buyer that the car, if sold at a
particular price, would be sold "as is," and with no guarantee. The
sales agreement stated: "this car not guaranteed." The circuit court
of appeals agreed with the lower court that there were no implied
warranties, and cited section 2-316 in support of this position." 2
Similarly, special words of disclaimer were given an absolute effect
in First National Bank of Elgin v. Husted,"' which held that words
similar to "as is" and "with all faults" have the effect of excluding
implied warranties. The Code does leave an escape, however, in
case a court decides that to enforce this language would be unjust.
Subsection (3) (a) begins by equivocating "unless the circumstances
indicate otherwise .... " No court has yet based a decision on that
language, but there are some indication to that effect in an Illinois
case. The court in Crown Cork & Seal Co. Inc. v. Hires Bottling Co.
of Chicago1 4 was confronted by a sale of bottling equipment under
o8U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
109 Shanker, supra note 5, at 42.
n° See, e.g., Lindberg v. Coutches, 167 Cal. App. 2d 828, 334 P.2d 701 (App. Dep't,
Super. Ct. Alameda County 1959); Yanish v. Fernandez, 156 Colo. 225, 397 P.2d
881 (1965) ; Belvison, Inc. v. General Electric Co., 46 Misc. 2d 952, 260 N.Y.S.2d
579 (Sup. Ct. 1965) ; James Talcott, Inc. v. Finley, 389 P.2d 988 (Okla. 1964)
cases collected in Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 465, 472-75 (1969).
11"4 Conn. Cir. 685, 239 A.2d 42, 44 (1967).
112Id. at 46. The court also used the examination subsection, section 2-316(3) (b), in
support of its conclusion that no implied warranty arose.
113 57 Il1. App. 2d 227. 235, 205 N.E.2d 780. 784 (1965).
114 254 F. Supp. 424 (N.D. I11.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 371 F.2d 256 (7th Cir.
1967).
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an agreement providing that the property was sold "as is, where is."
The court held that this was a valid disclaimer of implied warranties, but not until it had reviewed all of the circumstances surrounding the case. 1 5 This leaves open the interesting possibility
that if a court is not satisfied with the "smell" of the transaction, it
could void the language of disclaimer by relying on the circumstances
surrounding the transaction." 6 Further, what is to prevent a court
from holding, as one pre-Code case did," 7 that certain implied-law
terms exist in every sales contract which may not be waived or defeated by the parties? This case, Mulder v. Casho, considered a contract with a conspicuous "as is" provision, but held, despite this
language, that the seller has a statutory duty to put the brakes of an
automobile in "good condition and good working order" before he
delivers the vehicle." 8 For the present, however, the seller is secure
if he interprets the Code provisions to mean what they say. "As is"
or "with all faults," and other similar phrases, will exclude implied
warranties unless the circumstances surrounding the transaction raise
a question about the intention of the parties.
Most vendors who have consulted with counsel regarding their
sales contracts have apparently been advised to use the extact language of the Code. There have been some other phrases used, however, which have been intended to call the buyer's attention to the
lack of implied warranty. The general pharase "no warranties, express
or implied" is apparently not sufficient to exclude all implied warranties since the official comments to section 2-316 have declared
this particular phrase to be anathema. 1 9 Other authorities agree
with this interpretation. 0 There is a conflict over the phrase "accepted in its present condition." Hull-Dobbs, Inc. v. Mallicoat,121
held that such language referred to acceptance, and is not synonomous with "as is," which refers to representations which have
induced acceptance. However, in First National Bank of Elgin v.
Husted,"2 the court stated that the words "in its present condition"
are similar to the words "as is," and have the effect of excluding all
254 F. Supp. 424, 427. The court examined depositions on file and the contract
itself, and noted that the equipment was purchased used.
118 Compare the courts' use of the unconscionable doctrine in U.C.C. § 2-302, discussed
in text, § IV(B) infra.
" 7 Mulder v. Casho, 61 Cal. App. 2d 633, 394 P.2d 545, 39 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1964).
118 Id. at 637, 394 P.2d at 547, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 707. Compare discussion in Shanker,
supra note 5, at 40-41 n.124, where the author argues that a sale of a "truck" means
a "workable truck" and calls it part of the description.
119 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
120See generally Donovan, supra note 106, at 213; 1 HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL
GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 77 n.59 (1964). See also L & N Sales
Co. v. Little Brown Jug, Inc., 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 469 (1957).

115

121 57 Tenn. App. 100, 105. 415 S.W.2d 344, 345-46, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1032, 1034 (1966).
122

57 Il. App. 2d 227, 236, 205 N.E.2d 780, 784 (1965).
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implied warranties.' 2 3 There is no clear reconciliation point between
the two cases, except that the Husted court also discussed the buyer's
examination of the goods as having some bearing on the exclusion
of warranties.
The fact that the parties use the word "guarantee" instead of
"warranty" will have no effect on the effectiveness of the disclaimer
as long as the intention of the parties is clear from the facts surrounding the transaction. 124 An interesting point was noted in an early
discussion of the warranty disclaimer provisions: 12 Section 2-316(2)
states, "language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is
sufficient if it states, for example, 'there are no warranties which
extend beyond the description on the face hereof.' " The question
is whether this language, if used, would exclude part of an implied
warranty of merchantability, since "all implied warranties of fitness
... would seem to include fitness for ordinary purposes, and that
is an aspect of the warranty of merchantability. 12 The language of
section 2-316(2) should not be so construed, since it is obvious from
the organization of that section that the draftsmen intended to treat
the warranty of merchantability and the warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose separately.' 27 The recommended language is intended to be illustrative of a proper disclaimer for the latter warranty
only, 128 and the words "fitness for a particular purpose" should be
read into this portion of section 2-316(2) for clarity.
When the seller uses this special language, there is some confusion regarding whether it must be stated conspicuously. 2 1 Section
2-316 requires conspicuous terms to exclude implied warranties when
it discusses them in subsection (3). Professor William Hogan has
concluded that such terms need not be conspicuously stated because
subsection (3) provisions are operative "notwithstanding subsection
(2)," and subsection (3) says nothing about conspicuous terms."'
The cases would seem to support him. In First National Bank of
123Id. See also Tibbitts v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967).
Compare Chamberlain v. Bob Matick Chevrolet, Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. 685, 239 A.2d 42,
4 U.C.C. Rep. 936 (1967), with Ryan v. Aid, Inc., 149 Mont. 358, 427 P.2d 53
(1967).
125 Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28, at 255.
126 U.C.C. § 2-314 provides in part:
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as:
124

(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used ....
127 See also U.C.C. § 2-316(2), Comment 4.
128 "Unlike the implied warranty of merchantability, implied warranties of fitness for
a particular purpose may be excluded by general language, but only if it is in
writing and conspicuous." U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 4. Therefore, the language
recommended by the Code is general language. See also U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
129 What the courts have held to be conspicuous is discussed in text, § III(A) (3) (a)
infra.
130 Compare Hogan, supra note 27, at 7 n.29 with J. HONNOLD, LAW OF SALES AND
SALES FINANCING 96 (3d ed. 1968).
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Elgin v. Husted,"' the disclaiming language was printed in the same
size type as the rest of the contract, and the provision "accepted in
its present condition" was held to be a valid exclusion. 1 2 Cases decided under pre-Code law likewise support this position. In Claxton
v. Pullman, Inc.' the "as is" provision was held to be a part of
the agreement although it was stated on the reverse side of the
contract. On the other hand, the principle of internal consistency in
statutory construction would indicate that the requirement for conspicuous terms of subsection (2) should be carried over to subsection
(3)."' In addition, since the purpose of section 2-316 is to call the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranty, and since the courts
consider all the circumstances surrounding the transaction, it seems
logical to conclude that phrases under subsection (3) should be conspicuous. 13 5 At least that is the surest way to use the language
effectively.
Finally, there is the question of whether the special language
may be oral or must be in writing. Again, subsection (3) says
nothing, while subsection (2) requires a writing to disclaim a
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 3 6 The same arguments
just presented regarding the requirement of conspicuousness apply
here. No court has ever decided the issue. The safest rule is to
include such language in a writing, and to do so is preferable for
37
evidentiary purposes.
2. Exclusion of All Implied Warranties by Stating Express
Warranties - Exclusion and Integration Clauses
Sellers have long attempted to limit recovery in warranty by
stating one express warranty to the exclusion of all other warranties.
A typical example is stating that the product is guaranteed against
defects in workmanship for one year, and that this warranty is in
lieu of all other warranties express and implied. These "exclusion"
clauses merely amount to disclaimers couched in the form of a
limited and exclusive express warranty.13 8 In fact, it has been
intimated that sellers are anxious to provide some kind of limited
warranty only for the purpose of excluding implied warranties
which could otherwise return to haunt them.'3 9 Prior to the
131 57 Ill. App. 2d 227, 236, 205 N.E.2d 780, 784 (1965).
132M
Id. See also Baselice v. 341 Reid Avenue Corp., 5 U.C.C. Rep. 493 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
1968) (upholding an "as is" provision hidden in paragraph 10 of a lengthy contract).
133 116 Ga. App. 416, 157 S.E.2d 642 (1967).
134 See Donovan, supra note 106, at 213, 215-16 n.16 4 .
135 See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 32.
136 The warranty of merchantability may be excluded orally. U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
137 See Hogan, supra note 27 at 8. See also section VI(D) infra.
138 See Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 329; Duesenberg, supra note 6. at 163.
139 Blackburn, supra note 16, at 173.
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promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code, it was generally
held that a clause which provided a limited express warranty, and
stated it to be in lieu of all other warranties express and implied,
was an effective disclaimer.1 4 ° However, this theory was eroded on
two fronts. First, the case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc. 141 prompted courts to look carefully at any language directed
at the consumer and to attempt to detect a violation of public
policy. Accordingly, some courts have declared that clauses containing express warranties to the exclusion of all others did not
exclude implied warranties as being against public policy to do
so. 142 Secondly, some courts concluded that there was no reason
to exclude the implied warranties which were not inconsistent with
the express warranty. 143 The Uniform Sales Act adopted this position in section 15(6). If no inconsistency was found, therefore, the
implied warranties remained effective. The Code provisions which
apply to this problem are not specifically directed toward solving
it. Section 2-316 indicates that implied warranties may be excluded
if the parties agree to the exclusion. However, section 2-317 states
certain rules to be followed if warranties are conflicting. The
pertinent language of this section is as follows:
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such construction
is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall determine which
warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that intention the following
rules apply:
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.

Further, section 2-719 states that the parties may agree upon a
remedy, to the exclusion of all others, which will restrict the cause
1 44
of action for breach of warranty.
140 See, e.g., Shafer v. Reo Motors Inc., 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Guhy v. Nichols
& Sheperd Co., 33 Ky. L. Rep. 257, 109 S.W. 1190 (1908); Hargrove v. Lewis,
313 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. App. 1958) ; Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E.
525, modified as to counterclaim, 256 N.Y. 640, 177 N.E. 174 (1931). See also.
Mattson v. General Motors Corp., 9 Mich. App. 473, 157 N.W.2d 4S6 (1968);
Klimate-Pruf Paint & Varnish Co. v. Klein Corp., 1 N.C. App. 431, 161 S.E.2d 747
(1968). For brief discussions of pre-code law see Layer, Sales Warranties Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 Mo. L. REV. 259, 284-85 (1965) ; Note, Consumer
Protection, supra note 28, at 258 n.120; Note, Warranty Disclaimers, supra note 95,
at 399.
1' 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See text accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
42
1 See Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966).
Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 Il. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966). See
also Manheim v. Ford Motor Co., 201 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1967); Crown v. Cecil
Holland Ford, Inc., 207 So.2d 67 (Fla. App. 1968).
143 See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964)
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Flexible Tubing Corp., 270 F. Supp. 548 (D. Conn. 1967)
Tucson Utility Supplies, Inc. v. Gallagher, 102 Ariz. 499, 433 P.2d 629 (1967).
144See text, § V(B) (2) infra.
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It is possible to interpret a clause which states an express
warranty to the exclusion of all others as falling within either
section. Under section 2-316 the clause may effectively disclaim
implied warranties away in favor of the express warranty. And
under section 2-719, if the remedy prescribed by the parties is
intended to be exclusive, it will be considered the sole remedy
in case of breach. Under section 2-317 the clause may have no
effect because the express warranty, standing alone, is not inconsistent with the implied warranties. Courts which have upheld
such provisions as effective disclaimers have generally done so on
a freedom of contract theory,14 accepting the express warranty in
lieu of the implied warranties. Several cases further note that the
146
enforcement of these clauses in no way offends public policy.
One case reasoned that the legislature was aware of public policy
when it considered the Code, and, if it would offend public policy
to exclude implied warranties in this manner, the legislature would
have obviated the possibility when the Code was adopted.' 4 7 It

is plausible that these exclusion clauses do qualify under section
2-316 to exclude implied warranties of fitness for a particular
purpose. They are always in writing, and, if conspicuous, all of
the requirements to exclude those implied warranties have been
met. 14s But it is difficult to understand how courts conclude that
the language of these clauses would exclude an implied warranty
of merchantability. Section 2-316(2) requires that the language,
unless it falls within subsection (3) (a), must mention "merchantability." Yet a district court in Arrow Transportation Co. v.
Fruehauf Corp., 4' was faced with a breach of a warranty of
merchantability where the seller had expressed a warranty to the
exclusion of all others. The opinion states that the Uniform Commercial Code, "in essence, provides that the parties are free to
contract away any warranties which may be implied by law, the
only requirement being that the disclaimer be clearly stated and
45

See Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505, 510 (7th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969) ; Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle, 402
S.W.2d 429, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 397 (Ky. App. 1966).
146See Desando!o v. F & C Tractor & Equip. Co., 211 So.2d 576, 580 (Fla. App. 1968);
Thorman v. Polytemp, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 772, 774 (Westchester County Ct., N.Y.
1965). But see Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., 340 Mass. 430, 165 N.E.2d 107
(1960). In Hall, Justice Wilkins enforced a clause creating an express warranty
to the exclusion of implied warranties, and then lamented: "This is not the kind of
an agreement which commends itself to the sense of justice of the court . . . . We
hope that should a similar case arise under the Uniform Commercial Code we shall
not be bound by precedent." Id. at 432, 165 N.E.2d at 109.
147Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 978, 154 S.E.2d 140, 144-45
(1967).
148 U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
'19 289 F. Supp. 170 (D. Ore. 1968).
1
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be conspicuous. ' " This is overstating freedom of contract at the
expense of the clear requirements of section 2-316. The language
used in exclusion clauses may not be fairly considered within the
provisions of subsection (3) (a),"' and therefore must contain
the word "merchantability" to exclude that warranty under subsection (2). The better rule seems to be that the warranty of
merchantability survives a clause which states that an express
warranty is given in lieu of all other warranties.' 5 2 In one case the
clause stated that the express warranty was in lieu of "any implied
warranty of merchantability." Nevertheless, the court held in this

case, Walsh v. Ford Motor Co.,' that absent a clear showing of
commercial reasonableness, the exclusion would be stricken as a
matter of law.
Other courts have held that exclusion clauses will not have
the effect of disclaiming implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose because those implied warranties are not inconsistent with the express warranty, and are therefore saved by section 2-317.154 This, too, is a preferable rule. Although warranties
of fitness for a particular purpose may be disclaimed by general
language of this type under section 2-316, they should be retained
in almost every case under section 2-317.1 Where the seller has
led the buyer to believe that all warranties can be performed while
inserting an exclusion clause into the contract, the seller is estopped
from raising the exclusion clause as a defense.1'; However, if the
seller has stated an express warranty to the exclusion of all implied
warranties, and has done so in good faith not realizing an inconsistency with a warranty of fitness, then section 2-317(c) will retain
0

Id.

at 172-73. See also Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle, 402 S.W.2d 429, 3 U.C.C. Rep.
397 (Ky. App. 1966); Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 154
S.E.2d 140 (1967). In Marshall, the court expresses no opinion on whether the
language would be sufficient to exclude implied warranties under the Code. Id. at
978, 154 S.E.2d at 145.
151 See text accompanying notes 119-20 supra for a discussion of the words "all warranties, express or implied, are excluded."
152 See Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 249 F. Supp. 649, 5 U.C.C. Rep.
1219 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Huntsman, 246 Ark. 149,
437 S.W.2d 784 (1968); Willman v. American Motor Sales Co., 44 Erie Co. L.J.
51, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 100 '(1961). See also Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d
585, 593 (8th Cir. 1964) (decided under the 1952 Code) ; Mutual Services of
Highland Park, Inc. v. S.O.S. Plumbing & Sewerage Co., 93 Ill. App. 257, 235 N.E.2d
265 (1968).
1sa 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540 (Sup. Ct. 1969), citing Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
154 See Sutter v. St. Clair Motors, Inc., 44 I1. App. 2d 318, 323, 194 N.E.2d 674, 677
(1963) (court applies reasoning of section 2-317 but refers to section 2-316) ; L. &
N. Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188 Pa. Super, 117, 146 A.2d 154, 157 (1958).
15 U.C.C. § 2-317, Comment 2 states that where the seller has in good faith caused an
inconsistency, the "intention" rules of section 2-317 apply, and they presume the
intention of the parties to be the retention of the implied warranty of fitness.
156U.C.C. § 2-317, Comment 2.
15
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the implied warranty of fitness.' According to the Code provisions,
therefore, the typical exclusion clause may exclude the implied
warranty of fitness if the evidence is clear that such a result was
the exact intention of the parties, so as to overcome the presumed
intention of the parties stated in section 2-317(c).15 Absent a clear
showing that the intention of both parties has been adopted by an
exclusion clause, it should have no effect whatsoever. Where the
exclusion clause states a limited remedy, and provides that this
remedy is intended as the exclusive remedy in case of breach of
contract, the effect may be to exclude any action alleging breach
of implied warranties. This type of clause and its effect are considered in detail later. 59
A related problem is the use of the "integration" or "merger"
clause, stating that the written contract contains all of the agreements between the parties and is intended by the parties as the
final expression of the agreement. The parol evidence rule has a
profound effect on express warranties,16 ° but, alone, it has no
effect at all on implied warranties. Since implied warranties are
generally viewed as arising by operation of law, rather than by
conduct of the parties, the parol evidence rule is irrelevant to
implied warranties.'
Moreover, the parol evidence rule is specifically incorporated into the Code provisions dealing with disclaimer of express warranties, while the provisions relating to
disclaimer of implied warranties do not refer to the rule.'" 2 The
parol evidence rule, then, will not operate as an unbargained-for
disclaimer of implied warranties - it never has. Cases decided
prior to the adoption of the Code have generally held that a provision in a contract that the writing contains all of the agreements
between the parties does not affect implied warranties.' 63 Courts
interpreting the Code provisions have reached the conclusion that
the warranty exists despite the "integration" clause, unless specifically excluded.'
The integration clause may be used, however,
to help prove the intentions of the parties when an exclusion clause
15

7Id.
5 See U.C.C. § 2-317, Comment 3.

1 8
159

See text, § V(B) (1) infra.

160 See text, § I (C) supra.
161 See Note, Warranty Disclaimers, supra note 95, at 400.
162 Compare U.C.C. § 2-316(1) with U.C.C. § 2-316(2) and U.C.C. § 2-316(3). See

also Hogan, supra note 27, at 8-9.
163 See Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959); Frigidinners, Inc. v. Branchtown Gun Club, 176 Pa. Super. 643, 109 A.2d 202 (1955) ;
Hobart Mfg. Co. v. Rodziewicz, 125 Pa. Super. 240, 189 A. 580 (1937) ; White
Co. v. Francis, 95 Pa. Super. 315 (1929). But cf. S.F. Bowser & Co. v. Birmingham,
276 Mass. 289, 177 N.E. 268 (1931).
164
See Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962); rev'd in
part on other grounds. 320 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1963).
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is present, and together they may have the effect of excluding the
implied warranties. The fact that the buyer has signed an agreement
which states that it represents the entire contract between the
parties tends to show that he is willing to waive all of the prior
negotiations." 5
3. Technical Requirements to Exclude Each Separate Implied
Warranty
The use of recognized "disclaimer" language, such as "with
all faults" or "as is," has the effect of excluding all implied warranties of quality and performance. The Code treats each warranty
separately and prescribes special rules to follow in order to disclaim each warranty."' One troublesome factor is common to language disclaiming the warranty of merchantability and the warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose -in
either case, such language
must be conspicuous."'
a. Conspicuousness

The drafters of the Code apparently felt that some guidance
was necessary to help determine when language was conspicuous
enough to be effective. Accordingly, they drafted section 1-201(10):
'Conspicuous:" A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so
written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought
to have noticed it. A printed heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicious. Language in the
body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color. But in a telegram any stated term is "conspicuous." Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not is
for decision by the court.
This guidance generally followed pre-Code law which required that a disclaimer clause must be called to the buyer's attention to be valid.'1 6 Section 1-201(10) prescribes the manner in
which a disclaimer clause should be written to be effective. Onto
this the courts have engrafted some tests regarding the location
of such a clause.
A New York court in Minikes v. Admiral Corp.,16 9 had no
trouble in striking a disclaimer which had been written in print
smaller than the print in the rest of the contract.17 0 Similarly, a
165See Thorman v. Polytemp, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 772 (Westchester County Ct., N.Y.

1965).
16 The seller may have a valid reason for wishing to disclaim one but not the other.
One reason could be the courts' propensity to declare contracts which disclaim all
warranties to be unconscionable. See text, § IV(B) infra.
167 U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
168 See, e.g., Smith v. Regina Mfg. Corp., 396 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1968); Mosesian v.

Bagdasarian, 260 Cal. App. 2d 361, 67 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Ct. App. 1968); Ryan v.
Aid, Inc., 149 Mont. 384, 427 P.2d 53 (1967).
169 48 Misc. 2d 1012, 266 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
170See also Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195,
5 U.C.C. Rep. 30 (1968).
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number of courts have refused to uphold a disclaimer printed in
the same color and same size type as the rest of the contract. 7 '
In some cases, the heading to the section of the contract which
contained the warranty was printed in unusual type, but this was
not enough, 172 even where the language in the heading might have
73
hinted that a disclaimer was contained in that section.'
The practice of hiding the disclaimer language in the body of
the contract has been critized. 74 Similarly, placing the disclaimer clause on the back of the contract is undesirable, 1 75 especially if no reference is made on the front of the contract to the
language on the back.'" 6 In Hunt v. Perkins Machinery Co., 1 77 a
disclaimer clause was printed in capital letters on the back of the
contract, under the heading "TERMS AND CONDITIONS." On
the face of the contract in bold-face capital letters was the statement "BOTH THIS ORDER AND ITS ACCEPTANCE ARE
SUBJECT TO THE 'TERMS AND CONDITIONS' STATED IN
THIS ORDER." The court held that the reference on the front of
the contract was not sufficient to direct attention to the otherwise
conspicuous disclaimer language on the back, and the disclaimer
was ineffective.
To satisfy the requirement of conspicuousness, therefore, the
seller should state his disclaimer in a manner prescribed by section
1-201 (10), on the face of the contract, and in a separate paragraph.
b. Language to Exclude the Implied Warranty of
Merchantability
Language disclaiming the implied warranty of merchantability
may be stated orally or in writing.1 7

1

If it is in writing, it must be

Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585, 593 (8th Cir. 1964); Mack Trucks
of Arkansas, Inc. v. Jet Asphalt & Rock Co., 246 Ark. 99, 437 S.W.2d 459, 463, 6
U.C.C. Rep. 93, 98 (1969) ; Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Huntsman, 246 Ark. 149,
437 S.W.2d 784, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 100 (1969); Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 439
S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. App. 1969); Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation
Credit Clearing House, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 132, 137 (N.Y. Civil Ct. 1969). S.F.C.
Acceptance Corp. v. Ferree, 39 Pa D. & C.2d 225, 229, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 808, 810
(1966). See also Blackburn, supra note 16, at 179.
172 See Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 439 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. App. 1969).
173 See Mack Trucks of Arkansas, Inc. v. Jet Asphalt & Rock Co., 246 Ark. 99, 437
S.W.2d 459, 463, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 93, 98 (1969). The warranty section was titled
with the words "Vehicle Warranty." Then followed a section titled "Supplement
to Mack Standard Warranty Applicable to Mack Diesel Engines," in which the
disclaimer was stated. Id.
174 See Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. 30 (1968); Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing
House, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 132, 137 (N.Y. Civil Ct. 1969) ; S.F.C. Acceptance Corp. v.
Ferree, 39 Pa. D. & C.2d 225, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 808 (1966).
175 Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 439 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. App. 1969).
176 See Dailey v. Holiday Distrib. Corp., 260 Iowa 859, 151 N.W.2d 477 (1967).
177 352 Mass. 535, 536, 226 N.E.2d 228, 229 (1967).
178U.C.C. § 2-316(2). See Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28, at 255; Hogan,
supra note 27, at 7.
'7'
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conspicuous, and if it is oral it must specifically alert the buyer
to the fact that the warranty has been excluded.1 7 The substance
of the clause purporting to disclaim this warranty is suggested by
the Code. Section 2-316(2) states that the language must mention
"merchantability," and, of course, a draftsman will be well advised
to follow this directive. But section 2-316(2) does not say that
the disclaimer will be effective by the mere mention of the word
"merchantability." On the contrary, the purpose behind this section
would seem to indicate that any "legalese" which is not clearly
understood by the buyer will be ineffective.'
The rule, then, if
18
"
taken on its face, is probably unrealistic, ' since it will not warn
anyone but the most sophisticated buyer of the risk it transfers. The
1952 version of the Code proposed that this warranty could only
be excluded by "specific language, ' and a more realistic approach
would insist that this requirement be read into the present section
2-316.
Further, there is an argument, despite the specific language of
the statute, that the word "merchantability" may be omitted and
the disclaimer will still be effective. 11 3 This is based on the fact
that subsection (2) of section 2-316 is made subject to the general
provisions of subsection (3), and the latter does not specifically
require the use of the word to disclaim the warranty. To omit the
word "merchantability" is a hazardous practice that only provides
the courts with a handle on which to rely while declaring the disclaimer inoperative. This was the holding in Neville Chemical Co.
v. Union Carbide Co.,' where the disclaimer was stricken for
failure to specifically recite the word "merchantability."
Therefore, based on the underlying policy that the seller should
adequately apprise the buyer of his risk, an effective disclaimer
179Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Industries, Inc. 68 I11,
App. 2d 297, 306,
216 N.E.2d 282, 286, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 531, 533 (1966). The Admiral case involved
an oral contract which was executed before the Code was effective in Illinois. The
court interpreted section 2-316, however, to be consistent with its proposition that
a buyer would not be bound by the oral disclaimer unless he had been specifically
made aware that such a disclaimer existed. Id.
180 The exclusion of implied warranties is supposedly permitted only when the buyer
is not surprised. See U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
181A conclusion also reached by Professor Morris G. Shanker, who argues that a more
effective disclaimer would be: "These goods are not fit for the ordinary purposes
for which they are normally used and may actually cause you physical harm."
Shanker, supra note 5, at 41, 42.
182Section 2-316 of the 1952 Code provided:
(2) Exclusion or modification of the implied warranty of merchantability or of fitness for a particular purpose must be in specific language
and if the inclusion of such language creates an ambiguity in the contract as
a whole it shall be resolved against the seller ....
183 See Donovan, supra note 106, at 213.
184294 F. Supp. 649, 656, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1219, 1225 (W.D. Pa. 1968). See also Marion
Power Shovel Co. v. Huntsman, 246 Ark. 149, 437 S.W.2d 784, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 100
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of the warranty of merchantability should at least contain the
following: "there is no warranty of merchantability, and the seller
assumes no responsibility for the quality of the product or for
damage that may be caused by a defect in the product."
c. Language to Exclude the Implied Warranty of Fitness
for a ParticularPurpose
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may
not be disclaimed orally. To be effective, a disclaimer of this
warranty must be in writing and conspicuous. 18 5 Although section
2-316 does not require any specificity of language to disclaim this
warranty, it does suggest that a clause stating, "there are no warrarities which extend beyond the description on the face hereof,"
will be sufficient.' 8 6 This would seem to indicate that other language having the same general meaning would be equally effective.
It should merely inform the buyer that the seller is accepting no
responsibility for any reliance on his skill and judgment, and this
may be done in general terms.'

s

It would be unrealistic to require

any more from the seller, since he is unable to adequately ascertain
what he may have done to cause the buyer to rely on his skill and
judgment, so as to specifically disclaim that effect for each instance.
Nor does the buyer need additional protection. If the seller has
affirmatively commented about the product in such a way as to
encourage the buyer to purchase it for a particular purpose, the
seller may well have made an express warranty by affirmation of
fact. Whatever the buyer has inferred from the transaction should
not be so strenuously protected as to require carefully drafted
language of disclaimer.
B. Exclusion by Conduct

The reasonable expectations of the parties is the principle subject of protection in warranty law, just as in other contract law. 8
All of the facts surrounding the transaction must be considered in
determining the intention of the parties. Often these circumstances
will include certain conduct of the parties which indicate an intention to transfer or to accept the risk of a defective product. If
that intention is apparent from the conduct of the parties, all implied warranties may be excluded.
185 U.C.C. § 2-316(2).

186 See notes 125-27 supra, and accompanying text, for a discussion of this language
as it relates to all implied warranties.
187 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 4. See also Donovan, supra note 106, at 212.
188 See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 32.
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1. Examination
The buyer may have an opportunity to examine the goods
before he enters the contract. If he has examined the items "as
fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is
no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination
ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him . . . -8 The
policy behind this rule is simple. If the buyer notices the defect and
waives it, or fails to notice it through his own fault after having
ample opportunity to discover it, then the buyer should be estopped
from asserting the defect as a breach of warranty when he is
injured. However, it may be argued that a buyer would not assume
that a professional seller will have no further responsibility for
the goods merely because of his examination of the product.'9 0
But the buyer may have a duty to inquire into the extent of the
seller's further responsibility regarding the defect, and, of course,
if the seller gives assurances as to these matters, the buyer is pro-

tected by an express warranty. 1 '
The requirement that a buyer "examine" the goods constitutes
a modification of prior law, which merely required an "inspection." 19 ' The "examination" refers to the nature of the responsibility
assumed at the time the contract is made, while "inspection" refers
to activity before acceptance or any other time after the contract
is made. 193 The buyer's observations which may be said to form
part of the bargain constitute the operative disclaimer of implied
warranties here.
However, the buyer may be estopped from asserting a breach
of warranty where he has had an opportunity to examine the goods
and refuses."0 4 One court seems to have held that merely making
the goods available to inspection will provide the opportunity
9
The comments to section
necessary to exclude the warranties."'
9
2-316 directly refute this proposition, ' and the better rule is that
lsU.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b).

19 Shanker, supra note 5, at 42. The author argues that the buyer should be held to a
waiver only if he knows that the defective good will likely lead to the harm of which
he complains. "For example, a buyer may be aware that a screw is missing on a
machine. He may not have sufficient engineering sophistication to be aware that the
machine will fly apart under operation just because of the missing screw. If so, the
buyer ought not be denied all recovery for injuries caused him by the flying parts."
Id.
191 See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 32-33.
92
1
See Donovan, supra note 106, at 216; Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28, at
256-57 ; Ezer, supra note 27, at 317.
193 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8.
194 U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (b). See also Hawkland, supra note 20, at 33.
19 Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Crouse, 79 York L.R. 31, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 986 (Pa.
Ct. C.P. York County 1965).
196 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 46

the buyer's refusal is ineffective unless the seller has made a
demand that the goods be examined' 9 7 and unless the seller has
so demanded, the buyer cannot be said to have refused.' 9 8
If the buyer has either examined, or refused to examine, there
are no implied warranties as to defects which such examination
would have revealed.19 9 However, an implied warranty remains for
latent defects."' 0 The extent of the exclusion by examination will be a
question of fact for a jury to determine, 20 ' and will depend upon
the facts surrounding the examination, the means of examination
which were available, the manner in which it was conducted, and
the professional capacity of the person conducting the examination.20 2 As a practical matter, if the buyer possesses the technical
skill to detect a possible defect in the product, the seller should
demand that he examine it. Of course, this may result in his declining to purchase the product, but it is preferable to lose a sale
rather than expending large sums for consequential damages. There
is also a possibility that the buyer will refuse the demand, or, having
examined it, waive the defect.
2. Course of Dealing, Course of Performance, Usage of Trade
The conduct of the parties in performing previous transactions
may have the effect of excluding an implied warranty. 20 ' If these
prior dealings induce expectations that the buyer, rather than the
seller, is to assume certain risks, then the seller is relieved from
responsibility for those risks.20 4 The Code has followed prior law
on this subject. In Asgrow Seed Co. v. Gulick,2 ° ' the court held that
a valid custom concerning the subject matter of a contract, knowledge of which could be imputed to the parties, is incorporated into
the contract by implication. Thus, the buyers of seed, who had purchased from the seller on prior occasions and should have known
that the seller limited its liability in the invoice and on the container, could not assert a breach of warranty which contravened that
limitation. Of course, the buyer must either have actual knowledge
197See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 33; Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28, at
256.
198 David Pepper Co. v. Jack Keller Co., 6 U.C.C. Rep. 673 (Dep't of Agriculture 1969).
199 See Appeals of Reeves Soundcraft Corp., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 210 (Armed Services Bd.
of Contract Appeals 1964).
2 0
0 See Leveridge v. Notaras, 433 P.2d 935, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 691 (Okla. 1967).
201 Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1, 4
U.C.C. Rep. 650 (Va. App. 1967).
202 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8. See Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28, at 256.
203
U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (c). It may also have the effect of creating an express warranty.
See text accompanying note 57 supra.
20 4
See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 33-34.
205 420 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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of the course of performance or dealing, or be able to be charged
with such knowledge.20 6
IV.

JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION AND LIMITATIONS OF
WARRANTY EXCLUSION

A. Strict Construction
Disclaimers although a part of the contract are not constructive
terms. Instead, they tend to infringe upon protective doctrines
which have been established by the very same courts that must construe the disclaimer.2" 7 These courts are understandably hesitant to
enforce a provision which contractually disrupts the protection
they have developed over many years. Similarly, the aura surrounding the disclaimer is generally unpleasant. It is the rare case
where the buyer has a superior bargaining position. Where the
seller has the superior position, a standard contract is often used,
and the sale may be on a take-it or leave-it basis. Even when the
seller clearly informs the buyers of the intent to disclaim, the buyer's
attention may be directed elsewhere by the excitement of purchase,
and, if he notices the disclaimer, doesn't care - then. Though courts
are loathe to abandon the doctrine of freedom of contract, they
will, in most cases, try to obviate the seller's potential power of
abuse by excluding the disclaimer on any one of a number of
contract principles.2 0 1 Moreover, the court may find a disclaimer
so objectionable as to refuse to enforce it as a matter of "public
policy," 2 9 or "natural justice and good morals.''210
Courts have a tendency to construe disclaimers strictly.2 1 One

court described this tendency as "the commendable judicial feeling
that, whenever possible, a court should enable a buyer to obtain
something for his money.' '212 And that, whenever possible, is what
the courts do. A disclaimer, as a contract term, should be viewed
with an eye toward determining the intent of the parties. Yet, it
has been noted that judicial interpretation of disclaimers often
See Layer, supra note 140, at 284.
See generally Note, Limitations, supra note 4, at 727.
See Prosser, supra note 11, at 46-47.
2091Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 403-04, 161 A.2d 69, 95
(1960).
210
Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, Inc., 169 Misc. 879, 880-81, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110,
112 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1939).
211 See generally Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Flexible Tubing Corp., 270 F. Supp. 548, 561
(D. Conn. 1967) ; Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Industries, Inc., 68 Il1.
App. 2d 297, 305, 216 N.E.2d 282, 286 (1965) ; Hogan, supra note 27, at 6, n.24.
212 Berk v. Gordon Johnson Co., 232 F. Supp. 682, 688 (E.D. Mich. 1964), quoting
from Note, Warranties Disclaimers and the Parol Evidence Rule, 53 COLUe. L. REv.
858, 868 (1953).
206

207
208
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ignore this principle.2 13 Some special rules of construction applied
to disclaimers are worth noting: (1) If the disclaimer is "ambiguous," extrinsic evidence may not be supplied in order to
explain it.214 The courts will uphold the principle the disclaimer
sought to exclude rather than to attempt to ascertain the parties'
intent on the issue; (2) One construction employed to avoid the
effect of a disclaimer is by calling a defect in quality a failure of
consideration.21 This, in effect, says that if the disclaimer is
unimpeachable, the bargain is invalid; (3) Although form contracts invariably contain several paragraphs of fine print, the disclaimer provisions are the only ones that are not enforced;216 (4)

One court was quick to restrict the effect of the exclusionary language to some limited part of the liability and then allow recovery
on another related theory. 217
Usually, however, courts will exclude the disclaimer by extracting some defect in the course of bargaining, and explaining
that this irregularity prevented the buyer from agreeing on the
terms. The Uniform Commercial Code permits this analysis by
authorizing the court to determine whether a contract is unconscionable.2 18
B. UnconscionableDisclaimers

Section 2-302 was drafted in the Code in order to reform
outmoded concepts which had been developed by the common law
to protect a buyer from an unbargained contract. 1 9 This section
gave the courts sweeping power to deal with contract provisions
which are unbargained-for. It is as follows:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, purpose and effects to aid the court in making
the determination.
The comments explained that the purpose of the unconscionability provision is to prevent oppression and unfair surprise.22 °
Warranty Disclaimers,
supra note 95, at 401.
214 See Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 330, citing McPeak v. Boker, 236 Minn. 420,
53 N.W.2d 130 (1952).
215
See Note, Limitations, supra note 4, at 732-33. See also Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514,
519, 235 S.W.2d 988, 991 (1950).
218Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 330. See also Note, Limitations, supra note 4, at
727.
213 See generally Note, Limitations, supra note 4, at 726, Note,
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Unquestionably, the public interest and the determination to provide a fair remedy were considered by the drafters when this provision was drawn. Courts have continued to extract these vague
policy considerations from section 2-302.
Deeply rooted in the concept of oppression is the contract of
adhesion. The Henningsen decision22 1 was based partly on the fact
that the buyer had no choice of terms, since all automobile manufacturers were using the same contract. In order for a buyer to
assume the risk of a defective product, as he is required to do by
accepting a disclaimer provision, is it necessary that he have a
choice of whether or not to accept the disclaimer? Theoretically,
more is required than the choice between doing without the
product, and accepting the contract as drafted. "22 Moreover, section
2-316 which prescribes requirements for an effective disclaimer,
does not protect against a contract of adhesion. Therefore a disclaimer provision could easily satisfy the enumerated requirements,
and still be unbargained-for because the product to which it
applies is available from only one source. 223 Furthermore, even
where the classic adhesion contract situation does not exist, consumers ordinarily do not negotiate terms of a contract.22 4 Consequently, the court is presented with an opportunity to inquire
into each of these situations to determine if -considering
the
commercial setting, purpose, and effect-the bargain was oppressive and thereby unconscionable. An automobile warranty disclaimer was recently declared inoperative in Zabriskie Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Smith,'22 because it was not brought to the buyer's attention,
and the court classified it a "contract of adhesion." However, the
courts also have recognized that they must consider the commercial
setting in which the agreement is made, 226 and in Dow Corning
217 Water Works & Industrial Supply Co. v. Wilburn, 437 S.W.2d 951 (Ky.

1968).
U.C.C. § 2-302. See generally Note, Disclaimers,supra note 3, at 330.
219See generally U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1; Note, Warranty Disclaimers, supra
note 95, at 403-04.
220 U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
221 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
222 Compare Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 331, with Boshkoff, supra note 11, at
304-05, where the author argues that freedom of choice may be defined in different
ways. It has been argued that even ordinary contracts of sale are contracts of adhesion,
since they are "presented to consumers under conditions of haste, ignorance, and
compulsion." Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 328.
223 See Note, Warranty Disclaimers, supra note 95, at 399.
224 Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 329. The author notes that "[n]othing in the
small voice of a disclaimer will provoke the consumer into his own program of
insurance, testing, and caution after purchase." Id.
22599 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
218

M Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108,
5 U.C.C. Rep. 1213 (1968). See also Donovan, supra note 106, at 217.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 46

Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc.,2 2 7 a court found the commercial
setting to be controlling in holding that a limitation of damages
was not unconscionable.
A court reviewing a disclaimer provision may find that its
effect works an unfair surprise on the unsuspecting buyer. The
requirement of conspicuousness is found in section 2-316 and is
intended to mitigate against surprise. If the disclaimer was not
conspicuously stated, the court may simply conclude that it does
not satisfy the technical requirements for an effective disclaimer,"s
rather than ruling that it is unconscionable. An element of surprise
is presented when a latent defect causes a product to be worthless,
a situation the courts are not treating uniformly. Where the defect
is latent, so that neither party could be charged with knowledge
that injury may result, it is a question of fact as to whether or not
the waiver of warranties was unconscionable."2
Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,2 3 states that where a latent defect
exists that renders the goods worthless, a disclaimer of responsibility for that defect is manifestly unreasonable. 23 ' However, Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital,23 2 stands for the proposition that an
express disclaimer of warranty with respect to a latent defect in
blood which could not be detected and prevented was reasonable
and contractually valid.
The theory behind the unconscionability clause and the concern
of public policy obviously have a number of fundamental elements
in common. Accordingly, it's not surprising that the courts are
less than precise when using these concepts. Arguments have been
made that certain attempts to exclude the implied warranty of
merchantability should be interpreted as prima facie unconscionable,
since the seller is abdicating his professional responsibilities by so
disclaiming them.233 There is some merit to this proposition, especially since certain attempts to limit damages for personal injuries
are accorded the status of "prima facie" unconscionability under
section 2-719.234 Presently, however, the warranty of merchantability remains a negotiable issue, at least theoretically, and its
exclusion will be governed by normal rules of unconscionability as
promulgated by the Code. Stated simply, the application of the
=2 411 F.2d 622, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 589 (7th Cir. 1969).
228 See, e.g., Minikes v. Admiral Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 1012, 266 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Dist.
Ct. Nassau County 1966) and text, § III(A) (3) (a) supra.
229 Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778, 782, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 312,
316 (1968).
230 377 F.2d 846, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 164 (3rd Cir. 1967).
231 Id. at 850, 4 U.C.C. Rep. at 169.
32 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 897, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 561 (1967).
233 Shanker, supra note 5, at 43-44.
234 See text accompanying notes 268-70, infra.
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unconscionability clause to disclaimers depends on the extent to
which the negotiation of the contract and the effect of the disclaimer shocks the conscience of the courts. There is no formula for
coping with the hoary problem of unconscionability. The seller
may avoid the problem of unfair surprise by taking every prescribed precaution to call the buyer's attention to the disclaimer.
However, the problem of oppression, and the extent of which
the courts feel the disclaimer violates public policy, are intangibles which are incapable of reduction to a common denominator.
For these reasons, the seller should avoid overbroad disclaimers
that seek to exclude all potential liability. Further the seller must
show that the bargain is not, in the commercial setting, oppressive
to the buyer. A record of any negotiation of the disclaimer provisions will help to prove that the disclaimer was not oppressively
obtained. As a general principle, the seller should attempt to conduct the transaction as he, if he were a judge, would like to see
it conducted.
C. Disclaimers Not Contemporaneous With the Sale
In order to enforce a disclaimer, a court must be able to find
that the parties have agreed to its effect. Generally, language of
disclaimer is included in the written contract which is executed to
consummate the transaction, and thus, if all other requirements are
met, a court may infer that the parties have agreed to the stated
terms. However, this inference will not be drawn where the disclaimer
is proposed after the sale has been completed and thus, subsequent
language of disclaimer will have no effect on the warranties, which
35
become binding when the contract is signed.
The Code itself covers this point specifically only in one casewhen a security agreement is executed after the parties have agreed
on the sale. Subsection 9-206(2) provides that the Sales article
governs exclusion or modification of warranties when a security
agreement is involved, and a comment to that section indicates that
a buyer will not inadvertently abandon his warranties by a "no
warranties" term in the security agreement when warranties have
already been created under the sales arrangement.23" Futhermore,
pre-Code decisions recognized that an attempt to disclaim warranties on or after delivery by language on an invoice, receipt, or
other notice, is ineffective. 23 For example, in Tiger Motor Co.,
235 See

Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28, at 257.
U.C.C. § 9-206, Comment 3. For a discussion of the earlier version of this section
regarding this issue, see Donovan, supra note 106, at 213-14 n.158.
23
7 See Trane Co. v. Gilbert, 73 Cal. Rptr. 279 (Ct. App. 1968) ; Admiral Oasis Hotel
Corp. v. Home Gas Industries, Inc., 68 I11. App. 2d 297, 216 N.E.2d 282 (1965)
(implying that a similar result would be obtained under section 2-316).
36
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Inc. v. McMurtry2 . the court held a disclaimer of warranties in
an "Owner's Manual" ineffective to exclude express or implied
warranties where the manual was given to the buyer when the
automobile was delivered.2 9 Of course, if the buyer has agreed
to the disclaimer, and the later written disclaimer merely confirms
the agreement between the parties, he should not be allowed to
escape its effect by alleging it was delivered after the sale had
been consummated.
V.

MODIFICATION OR LIMITATION OF DAMAGES AND
REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY

It may appear apparent from the foregoing that the chances
for a seller successfully running the obstacle course of disclaimer
are reasonably slim. If his disclaimer is impeccably drafted he
runs the risk of being unable to market the product.24 ° If he
attempts to impose a disclaimer which raises only slight anxiety
in the buyer, it may not be legally sufficient to apprise him of
the risk.24 1 A seller facing such a dilemma may well consider
minimizing the effect of an ineffective disclaimer. This he is permitted to do, within limits, by sections 2-718 and 2-719 of the
42

Code.1

A. Liquidated Damages

The parties to a sale may agree on an amount of damages
which reasonably anticipates harm which may be caused by the
breach. Section 2-718 provides:
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in
the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the
light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach,
the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term
fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.

Of course, this provision is most applicable in a commercial
setting. 4 3 It would be an unusual transaction for a sale to a con238 224 So. 2d 638, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 608 (Ala. 1969).
239See also Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195, 5
U.C.C. Rep. 30 (1968).
240 See Note, Contract Draftsmanship Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 564, at 594-95 (1964).

241 See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 29.
242 These sections are carefully intertwined with warranty disclaimers by reference to
them in section 2-316(4). It is almost as if the draftsmen of section 2-316 were
remarking with tongue-in-cheek that the disclaimer provisions which precede this
reference were too confusing to be followed with consistent success.
243 Murray, The Consumer and the Code. A Cross-Sectional View, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV.
11, 36 (1968).
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sumer to contain a liquidated damage provision, and, even if such
a provision were included, it would be doubtful that it was a
product of agreement of the parties. 44
"Reasonableness" of the agreed damages is the test of validity
of this portion of the agreement, and apparently each of the three
tests enunciated in subsection 2-718(1) must be met or the
damages clause will be ineffective. 4 5 Therefore, no convenient
or feasible alternative remedy can exist, and circumstances surrounding the transaction must indicate that it will be difficult to
prove the amount of loss. These two elements of reasonableness
really constitute the central purpose of a liquidated damages provision. Dean Hawkland argues that in the absence of these factors,
the liquidated damages clause will be superseded by general
remedies, because subsection 2-719(2) directs that result when a
limited remedy fails of its essential purpose.246 In addition to these
elements, the estimated damages must reasonably approximate the
actual harm expected by the breach. If unreasonably large liquidated
damages are stated, the clause is void as a penalty. 4 T It is doubtful
that a seller who is seeking to minimize his liability for breach
of warranty will agree to an unreasonably large liquidated damages
provision. However, should he attempt to stipulate an unreasonably
small amount, the clause could be considered to be unconscionable
and stricken for that reason. 48 A circuit court of appeals in Dow
Corning Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc.,2 49 held that an agreement
which limited the purchaser's remedy for failure or delay in the
delivery of a plane to the return of its deposit was not unconscionably small in light of the experimental product and flexible
nature of the transaction. Apparently, a court will evaluate the
damage provision in the context of its commercial setting to decide whether or not the clause is reasonable.
The seller may, and should, attempt to estimate potential
damages which may follow from the sale of the product and the
amount used in a liquidated damage provision should approximate
that estimate. The fact that the estimate was made, and that the
liquidated damage provision was based on the estimate, will assist
the seller in proving the reasonableness of the provision.
In such a case, it may be stricken as unconscionable under section 2-302, since it is a
provision in a contract of adhesion. See text, § IV(B) supra.
2SSee
Hawkland, supra note 20, at 38, 39. See also U.C.C. § 2-718, Comment 1.
246 Hawkland, supra note 20, at 39. See also Denkin v. Sterner, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 230,
1 U.C.C. Rep. 173 '(1956).
244

4

2 7U.C.C.

§

2-718(1).

248 U.C.C. § 2-718, Comment 1. See also Murray, supra note 243, at 36.
249411 F.2d 622, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 589 (7th Cir. 1969).
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B. Limitation of Remedy
The more frequent method used by a seller to minimize his
responsibility for warranty problems is the contractual limitation
or modification of remedies for the breach. Section 2-719 governs
this manipulation:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this
section and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation

of damages,
(a)

the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to

or in substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit
or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article,
as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the
remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the
sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to
fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in

this act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusio nis unconscionable. Limitation of consequential
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods
is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where
the loss is commercial is not.
1. Restricted Remedies
A majority of the clauses which are drafted in reliance on
this section follow the illustration provided therein and limit the
buyer's options to returning the goods for repair or replacement
or to obtaining a refund of the purchase price. 250 Apparently,
however, the parties are left free to shape any remedies they may
agree upon, provided there are at least minimum adequate remedies
available. 2 5 ' The latter phrase should signify to the perceptive
reader that this provision, like all others which may affect the
consumer, will be subjected to the most thorough judicial scrutiny.
Courts have several options available by which they may disapprove
of stipulated remedies: (1) the court may find that it was not
intended to be an "exclusive" remedy; (2) even if intended as
exclusive, it may "fail of its essential purpose;" and (3) it may be
unconscionable.
The special remedies which the parties incorporate into their
agreement exist merely as additions to normal contract remedies,
unless it is expressly agreed that the stated remedies are exclusive.252
250U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a). See Blackburn, supra note 16, at 179; Note, Warranty
Disclaimers, supra note 95, at 407.
§ 2-719, Comment 1.
252
See U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 2.
251 U.C.C.
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Thus, if the parties agree that the buyer may return the goods for
free repair and replacement, that is only an option which the buyer
may add to his arsenal of remedies, unless that remedy is stated
to be exclusive of all others. 2 3 In an early case interpreting the
Code,2" 4 the court held that the requirement of exclusivity had
been satisfied when the seller provided free replacement of defective parts and stated that "this warranty is in lieu of any and
all other warranties stated or inferred, and of all other obligations
on the part of the manufacturer." In Dow Corning Corp. v.
Capitol Aviation, Inc.,25 the court determined that the remedy
provided was intended to be the only recourse by surveying the
circumstances surrounding the transaction, and the court noted
that this result obtains despite the fact that the clause in the
contract did not say the remedy contained therein is exclusive.
Despite this decision, a seller would be well advised to clearly
state that the remedy prescribed is intended to be exclusive.
Even if the parties have stated their intention to accept the
stated remedy as "exclusive," a court may overlook that intention
if the remedy fails "of its essential purpose. '"256 In such a case, the
right to pursue normal contract remedies is resorted to the buyer.2 5
Basically, this provision gives the court opportunity to determine
whether or not the remedy devised earlier is reasonable, in light
of the circumstances surrounding the transaction at the time of
the breach. 258 Therefore, even though the buyer may have agreed
to the limited remedy and at that time it was reasonable, if the
circumstances at the time of breach show that the buyer would
not have a fair remedy, the court may declare that the remedy has
failed of its essential purpose. A simple example is one in which
the parties agree that the exclusive remedy will be to return the
goods and the price will be refunded. If the goods are destroyed
because of inherent defects, they obviously cannot be returned, and
the remedy has failed of its essential purpose. In Wilson Trading
Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd.,2 59 the contract provided that no
claims pertaining to defects in the yarn being sold would be
2 1d. See generally Note, Contract Draftsmanship, supra note 240 at 595; Murray,

supra note 243 at 37; Note, Warranty Disclaimers, supra note 95, at 407. "The
seller's liability shall be limited to repair and replacement of goods or parts defective in materials or workmanship. This shall be the buyer's sole and exclusive
remedy whether in contract, tort or otherwise." Id. Can the buyer's right to a remedy
in tort be restricted in this manner? See Shanker, supra note 5 at 40, 43.
254 Evans Mfg. Corp. v. Wolosin, 47 Pa. Luz. Leg. Reg. 238, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 193 (Pa.
Ct. C.P. Luzerne County 1957).
255411 F.2d 622, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 589 (7th Cir. 1969).
256 U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
257 1d.

28 See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 42.
-923 N.Y.2d 398, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1213 (1968).
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allowed if made after weaving, knitting, or processing, or more
than 10 days after receipt of shipment. The defect in the yarn
could not be discovered until after the yarn had been processed
and the finished product had been washed. The court held that
the prescribed limitation failed of its essential purpose because
it prevented all remedies. 6 ° This result might be avoided by
providing two exclusive remedies at the outset, one to operate
as an alternative should the other fail. This makes it considerably
more difficult for a court to declare that the prescribed remedies
are unreasonable.2 1 1 In the Wilson case, then, besides the time
limitation, the contract should have provided that "if the defect
is latent and cannot be discovered within the prescribed time, the
buyer's sole and exclusive remedy shall be return of the purchase
price."
Finally, although the remedy is exclusive, and may still be
performed as provided, it could be unconscionable. In such a case,
262
a court may strike it and proceed as though it never existed.
According to a New York supreme court, speaking in Walsh v.
Ford Motor Co.,263 the test of whether the prescribed remedy must
be stricken as a matter of law, is the absence of factual evidence
that the limitation was commercially reasonable and fair, rather
than oppressive and surprising to a purchaser. 64 In this case, the
purchaser had been injured when his new automobile went out
of control due to defects in the throttle linkage, and the seller
had limited its responsibility to repair and replacement of defective
parts.2 5 On the other hand, Dow Corning Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc.266 found that there was nothing unreasonable in restricting the buyer's rights to cancellation of the contract and
return of the deposit considering the circumstances surrounding
the transaction. 2 67 A limited remedy must provide adequate redress
in the context of the transaction, and must not surprise the pur26

0Id., at 404, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 112-13, 5 U.C.C. Rep. at 1217. See also Neville Chemical

261

Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 249 F. Supp. 649, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1219 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
See generally Note, ContractDraftsmanship,supra note 240, at 596.

262 U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 1.

263 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 56 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
Id. 298 N.Y.S.2d at 539-40.
265 See also Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966)
(pre-Code law). But see Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle, 402 S.W.2d 429, 3 U.C.C.
Rep. 397 (Ky. 1966); Bassman v. Manhattan Dodge Sales, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 128
(Sup. Ct. 1968).
266411 F.2d 622, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 589 (7th Cir. 1969).
267See also Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 297
N.Y.S.2d 108, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1213 (1968). "Whether a contract or any clause of
the contract is unconscionable is a matter for the court to decide against the background of the contract's commerical setting, purpose, and effect ....Id. at 403-04,
297 N.Y.S.2d at 112, 5 U.C.C. Rep. at 1216.
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chaser. If the remedy fails to meet either criteria, it may be
considered unconscionable.
Limitation of Damages
Besides prescribing the type of remedy that the buyer may
pursue in case of breach, the seller may seek to limit his responsibility for consequential damages arising from the breach. This
is permitted in subsection 2-719(3), except insofar as the limitation
is unconscionable. That section goes on to provide that a limitation
on consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable. This provision is
necessarily interrelated with the restriction of remedies, since the
purpose of the latter is to minimize all damages, including consequential damages for personal injury.2 68 Arguably, the fact that
such a limitation is "prima facie" unconscionable is not intended
269
to mean that the limitation is always invalid without exception.
"Prima facie" should mean no more than "presumptively," and if
the seller could show that the limitation is neither surprising nor
oppressive, the limitation should be enforced. Construed in this
manner, the provision merely accomplishes a transfer of the burden
of proof. However, if this issue will be raised when a consumer
has suffered personal injury from a defective product, it will be
extremely difficult to prove that the limitation is fair. One commentator concludes that, as a practical matter, sellers attempt to
limit their damages, but realistically recognize consequential damage
270
liability as a possibility.
Since limitation of consequential damages is permitted in a
commercial setting, subject only to normal rules of unconscionability, 271 it is important to distinguish between consumer goods
2.

and those used in a commercial setting. Subsection 2-719(3)

pro-

vides that effect in the case of "consumer goods," which are defined
as goods which are "used or bought for use primarily for personal,
family or household purposes .... ",272 The question which this
provision leaves unanswered is: Does the language refer (1) only
to goods which are being used as consumer goods when the injury
occurs or (2) to goods destined for use as consumer goods? There
268See Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538, 6 U.C.C. Rep.

56 (Sup. Ct. 1969). Defendant, answering a claim of breach of warranty, pleaded a
clause in the contract which excluded all implied warranties and limited liability to
replacement or repair of defective or damaged parts. The court said, "[ilf the
pleaded defense is intended to exclude plaintiff from recovering damages for his
personal injury, such limitation is prima facie unconscionable .
Id., 298 N.Y.S.2d
at 539, 6 U.C.C. Rep. at 57.
269
See Note, Contract Draftsmanship, supra note 240 at 598-99.
27 0
1

Id. at 599.

2 See U.C.C. §§ 2-302, 2-719(3). See text, § IV(B) supra.
272U.C.C. § 9-109(1).
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is a strong argument that the language refers to goods destined to
become consumer goods, because that would place the responsibility
for the defect where it belongs -on
the manufacturer. 7 If that
is the case, a manufacturer could not create a limitation of consequential damages for personal injuries as to a dealer or intermediary who had been injured himself or had suffered a liability
as a result of a consumer's injury. A court considered this issue in
Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt,27 4 though it did not define "consumer
goods" so as to resolve this point. The court did, however, hold
that the manufacturer's limitation was unconscionable, even in a
commercial setting, because of the same policy reasons advanced
above. Certainly, however, a reasonable construction requires that
the goods are being used as consumer goods when the injury occurs.
Otherwise, there would have been no reason to specifically designate "consumer goods" in this section. Thus, an employee of an
intermediate seller who is injured by a product may be the victim
of one of these limitations since the goods are "inventory" at the
time the injury occurred. 7 Similarly, a truck driver who is injured
while making deliveries for his employer will be affected by a
limitation of damages clause since the truck is "equipment" in
this case. 76 However, a court may determine that the limitation is
unconscionable even in a commercial setting,2" and whether or
not such a limitation is unconscionable is a question of fact.27 One
court, having difficulty establishing unconscionability, decided that
the seller's intention to limit his liability for consequential damages
27
was not clearly stated, and therefore allowed these damages. 1
In Water Works & Industrial Supply Co. v. Wilburn2 80 the court
said that the limitation of consequential damages ("no claim for
labor or damages will be allowed") 28 ' applied only to damages
relating to the express warranty, and that it had no effect on
damages resulting from a breach of an implied warranty. It does
not appear, therefore, that courts are anxious to give the limitation
See generally Note, Contract Draftsmanship, supra note 240, at 598. But see Note,
Warranty Disclaimers, supra note 95, at 406.
274 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 312'(1968).
275 See Note, Warranty Disclaimers, supra note 95, at 405. "Inventory" and "consumer
foods" are mutually exclusive. Compare U.C.C. 9-109(1) with U.C.C. § 9-109(4).
276 See U.C.C. § 9-109(2).
277
See Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778, 782, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 312,
316 (1968).
278 Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 29 App. Div. 2d 303, 287
N.Y.S.2d 765, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 98 (App. Div. 1968).
279 Henry v. W.S. Reichenbach & Son, Inc., 45 Pa. D. & C.2d 17, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 985
(1968).
280437 S.W.2d 951 (Ky. 1968).
281 id. at 955.
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of damage clauses their full effect, even where personal injury to
consumer is not involved.
Despite this indication, and even though the Code specifically
refuses to enforce limitations on personal injury damages in the
case of consumer goods, there is enough confusion surrounding
this point that the seller should include such a limitation in his
contract. Such a clause should state that the seller is not responsible
for consequential damages resulting from a defect in the product
"on any theory whatsoever."
VI.

GENERAL RULES OF DRAFTSMANSHIP

A draftsman faced with the problem of preparing an effective
disclaimer has the difficult task of playing the roles of the diplomat
and field general simultaneously. The challenge is to prepare a
disclaimer which will clearly state the seller's position while not
destroying the marketability of the product by creating damaging
anxiety in potential buyers. Also, this language must measure up to
a court's criteria of "fair remedy," "reasonableness," and "conscionability."
A. Define the Risk
It is important from the outset to define the subject matter
of the disclaimer. The seller should exhaust all possibilities for
determining the quality of the product, the probability of a defect,
and the adequacy of safety precautions which may be employed
before the product is ever marketed. 28 2 Certain risks cannot be
eliminated from the transaction, but if the seller exhausts available
methods of risk determination, the risk which he assumes may be
more accurately estimated. Similarily, the seller should research
the potential damages which may result if a defect is not discovered
or if the disclaimer is held ineffective. As expected, risk will very
from product to product. For instance, raw materials carry the
potential for damages for a loss of profit, should they be defective,
whereas a finished product carries with it the potential high
damages associated with personal injury. 283 A disclaimer should
be directed to that risk which cannot economically or feasibly be
prevented. The seller should consider the possibility of improving
his quality control system, or of obtaining insurance to cover
proximate damages, rather than relying on a disclaimer to eliminate
these risks. The important point here is that the disclaimer should
be directed only to the unavoidable risk, and should not be ex282 See generally Blackburn, supra note 16, at 181.
283See generally Duesenberg, supra note 6, at 164.
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tended to include other risks which may be eliminated by other
means. If the disclaimer attempts to cover all risks inherent in
the product, it runs the risk of being unconscionable by being overbroad. A carefully-worded specific disclaimer which defines a
limited risk and excludes responsibility for that risk alone will
certainly receive more favorable judicial response.
B. Negotiate the Disclaimer
A seller should spend some time with the buyer discussing
the warranties and the manner in which the seller would like to
limit them. At this time, the seller should be prepared to make
concessions, if necessary, to get the buyer to agree to the terms.
This is normally done as a matter of course between a commercial
buyer and seller, and often overriding agreements are drafted for
repeat customers which defines the warranty liability applicable
to each

individual transaction. 284 However, in most consumer

transactions it is rarely accomplished in any meaningful sense.
No longer can a seller simply rely upon his "form" for
automatic protection, 28" and the negotiations surrounding the
transaction are becoming increasingly important. In one case,
involving the sale of an automobile, the salesman discussed the
disclaimer with the buyer, and clearly pointed out that the car
would be sold without warranty at the price the buyer requested.
The court discussed these negotiations as support for upholding the
disclaimer.2 86 Price negotiations surrounding disclaimer of warranty
liability are extremely effective. A buyer will remember that he
thought the price was too high at first, and that he was pleased
when the seller reduced it. This will help the seller show that
the reason for the reduction was a restriction on warranty liability,
and, without the warranty responsibility, the seller could offer the
product at a lower price. In turn, this will aid the court in defining
the quid pro quo for the waiver of warranty protection. Therefore,
the seller should, whenever possible, negotiate the price with
reference to the warranty liability, and impress upon the buyer
the reason for the price reduction.2"
C. Clarify the Agreement
The agreement between the parties will be carefully analyzed
by a court if a question as to warranty liability arises, and it is to
See Resnick, Conflicting Boiler Plate - Effect of the Uniform Commerical Code,
18 Bus. LAW. 401, at 406 (1963).
285 Blackburn, supra note 16, at 181.
286 Chamberlain v. Bob Matick Chevrolet, Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. 685, 239 A.2d 42 (1967).
287 See Blackburn, supra note 16, at 181.
284
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the seller's advantage to have the contract terms clearly stated.
Ambiquities in a contract are construed against their author, and
this is especially true when the ambiguous phrase is meant to
disclaim warranties.28 It should be apparent from the entire agreement precisely what limitations were placed on the warranties. The
seller should pay particular attention to the language used, especially as to what terms actually constitute the contract and where
and how they are placed within the contract.
The language used in such clauses should have a plain meaning
and that is the meaning which should be intended. Then the seller
may at least argue that if the buyer saw the clause he knew what
it meant. Arguably, this becomes a matter of semantics, but it may
mean the difference between a valid and an ineffective disclaimer.
For express warranties, where modification is possible, the
modifying language should be succinctly stated, and should make
the buyer's responsibilities obvious. Thus, it is preferable to say
that the copper brewing vat will not corrode if it is "washed daily"
than to say that it will not corrode "provided an adequate maintenance program is adopted." In addition, the language of modification should immediately follow the warranty language, so that
no confusion exists as to whether or not the disclaiming language
is meant to alter the warranty.2" 9 To disclaim implied warranties
the seller would be well advised to use the exact language specified
in the Code - "as is," or "with all faults." Variations on this
language should be discouraged. For example, the words "no
warranties express or implied" will probably not have a disclaiming
effect, and the phrase "in its present condition" has questionable
validity. To further clarify the agreement the seller may wish to
use other specific language indicating that no warranties exist in
addition to the explicit language suggested by the Code. This is
desirable as long as the additional language does not serve to hide
the Code words, and thereby reduce their effectiveness in notifying
the buyer of the lack of warranty protection.
In all cases of written disclaimers, particular care should be
taken to make the language conspicuous. This requires stating the
words in a certain manner and locating the phrase in a certain place.
As to manner, the direction provided by section 1-201(10) has
been approved by the courts. Therefore, print the words of disclaimer in capital letters, and wherever possible, in a different color.
Then locate this clause on the face of the contract in a separate
paragraph as it may not be safely placed on the back.
2
"

See Note, Strict Products Liability, supre note 33, at 919-20.

289 See Hogan, supra note 27, at 7.
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Related to conspicuousness is the concept of severability of
clauses. Any language of disclaimer should be physically separated
from language limiting remedies, or restricting the agreement to the
written contract, or other similar terms. The purpose for this is
that the invalidity of one clause will not affect the others. If a
court finds the disclaimer provision unacceptable, it will not declare
the other language limiting warranty liability inoperative simply
because the terms were placed together in the same paragraph.
Similarily, if the clauses are physically separated, a court does not
have to make a determination that they are separable.
Finally, the seller should attempt to define the limits of the
agreement wherever possible. If the contract clearly states that
what is contained therein is intended to be the complete and final
agreement between the parties, a court is less likely to look beyond
the agreement to extend the limits of negotiation. Thus, the "integration" or "merger" clause should be used whenever possible so
that the interpretation of the agreement is, as much as possible,
restricted to the four corners of the contract. Moreover, such a
clause may have an indirect disclaiming effect for express warranties by excluding those warranties made prior to the signing of
the contract. As to implied warranties, one of these clauses will
help to prove the buyer's intent to waive everything but the rights
explicitly stated in the contract.
D. Preparethe Evidence
Since a major concern surrounding warranty disclaimers is
whether they are bargained-for or surprising to the purchaser, the
seller should anticipate the possibility of a warranty dispute and
accumulate evidence which would support his disclaimer, and show
that the purchaser was fully aware of its inclusion at the time of
the transaction. One way in which this may be accomplished is for
the seller to request that the buyer sign his name under the paragraph disclaiming warranties, in addition to subscribing the contract in the normal fashion.2 9 ° He could even request that the buyer
write on the contract in "his own handwriting": "I understand
that there are no warranties with this product." Or he may require
the buyer's signature on a separate piece of paper which identifies
the product and states the disclaimer. Furthermore, the seller could
take a picture of the used car with the words "AS IS" painted
conspicuously on the windshield. Why not even have the buyer
stand next to the car when the picture is taken? Another possibility
is having two salesmen present when warranty provisions are dis29

See Griffin v. H.L. Peterson Co., 427 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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cussed. Similarily, in transactions where the buyer is able to competently evaluate the character and quality of the goods, a checklist
could be prepared on which the buyer acknowledges examination
of parts of the product by signing his initials. In short, be prepared
to prove that the buyer was, or should have been, aware of the
limitations on his protection. Once a court is convinced that the
buyer assented to the terms of a disclaimer, a major obstacle has
been hurdled.
CONCLUSION

By way of disclaimer, the conclusions which have been reached
herein are not intended to be the last word regarding the exclusion
or modification of warranties. In fact, if anything is certain from
an analysis of the law of disclaimers, it is that the judicial scrutiny
remains the most difficult hurdle. It should be apparent, however,
that the Uniform Commercial Code permits the seller some degree
of control over the hazards he risks in running his disclaimer by
the bench. A carefully drafted provision which meets all the
technical requirements, and which is called to the buyer's attention
and understood by him, will successfully exclude or modify warranty
liability. The seller's dilemma is reaching the delicate balance of
adequately apprising the buyer of his risks while still persuading
him to purchase the product. This burden is not insurmountable,
but it does force the seller to carefully plan the negotiations to
tailor an agreement to fit the transaction - following the technical
requirements of the Code - and to forthrightly define the limits
of his responsibility so that the buyer understands the limits of his
protection.
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